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THE NEW OLD LAW OF
ELECTRONIC MONEY
James Steven Rogers*
A variety of electronic money systems have recently been proposed or
implemented in which the initial transaction between the parties
would-without any contact to the banking system-result in the in-
stantaneous transfer of bank credit. For example, "smart-card" sys-
tems and various systems that have been proposed for internet
payment transactions would operate by loading transferable value
onto a device, so that a payment transaction could be completed by a
transaction between the parties, without any contact to the banking
system. It is generally assumed that there is no present law, statutory
or judge-made, that applies directly to such electronic money systems.
This article contends, to the contrary, that such electronic systems are
essentially identical to the system of circulating bank notes that flour-
ished in the United States in the early nineteenth century. Indeed, in its
strongest form, the claim considered in this article is not simply that
the law of circulating bank notes might serve as a source of potential
analogies, but that this body of case law already applies to such sys-
tems as a matter of ordinary principles of stare decisis.
I. INTRODUCTION
I N the late twentieth and now early twenty-first centuries, a variety ofpayment systems have evolved or have been proposed. Many aresimply new ways of transferring claims to bank accounts, so that com-
pletion of the payment requires a series of steps to actually change the
parties' claims against their banks. For example, when debit cards are
used in point-of-purchase transactions, the payment can be completed
only if the merchant has contact with the banking system so that the
amount of the purchase can be deducted from the buyer's account and
credited to the seller's account. Some of the proposed systems, however,
would operate in a different fashion. The initial transaction between the
parties would-without any contact to the banking system-result in the
instantaneous transfer of bank credit. For example, "smart-card" systems
and various systems that have been proposed for Internet payment trans-
actions would operate by loading transferable value onto a device, so that
* Professor, Boston College Law School. Special thanks to my colleague Ingrid Hil-
linger for comments on an earlier draft of this article.
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a payment transaction could be completed by a transaction between the
parties, without any contact to the banking system.
Such systems are often referred to as "electronic money" systems.! It
is generally assumed that there is no existing body of statutory or com-
mon law that would apply to such systems. For example, a 1996 Depart-
ment of Treasury report states:
In short, currently, no body of transactional rules comprehensively
defines the rights and obligations arising from electronic cash trans-
actions. The gaps might be filled by contracts between the parties or
by principles of law applicable to other payment systems that might
apply by analogy. The rights and obligations of parties regarding risk
allocation in electronic cash transactions thus may vary with the sys-
tem at issue. The significance of that uncertainty to the development
of electronic cash systems will depend upon the degree to which the
systems can successfully reduce risk by design and allocate risk by
agreement.2
The thesis of the present article is that this view is wrong. Neither courts
confronting questions that might be posed by systems of electronic
money nor lawyers participating in the design and implementation of
such systems will be writing on a clean slate. Rather, at least some of the
legal issues posed by such systems can be analyzed by looking to the ex-
tensive body of case law developed in the early nineteenth century con-
cerning circulating bank notes. Indeed, in its strongest form, the claim
considered in this article is not simply that one might look to the law of
circulating bank notes as a source of potential analogies, but that this
body of case law may already apply to such systems as a matter of ordi-
nary principles of stare decisis.
II. VARIETIES OF PAYMENT SYSTEMS
In considering the law that may apply to various forms of payment sys-
tems, it is useful to divide systems into three categories: currency, deposit
account transfer systems, and note transfer systems.
A. CURRENCY
The simplest form of payment system is currency. Currency is a me-
dium of exchange that the sovereign has declared to be "money" in the
fairly strong sense of "legal tender." That is, money is a form of circulat-
ing medium the transfer of which automatically discharges the underlying
1. See generally American Bar Association Task Force on Stored-Value Cards, A
Commercial Lawyer's Take on the Electronic Purse: An Analysis ofCommercial Law Issues
Associated with Stored-Value Cards and Electronic Money, 52 Bus. LAW. 653 (1997). This
report is perhaps the most comprehensive treatment of electronic money issues, including
at least brief treatment of the nineteenth-century case law on circulating bank notes that is
discussed in detail in this article.
2. U. S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, TOWARD ELECTRONIC MONEY AND BANKING: THE
ROLE OF GOVERNMENT App. 1 (1996), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/netbank/ra.
htm.
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debt for which it was transferred.3
The simplest form of currency system is a specie-based system. In a
specie-based system, the medium of exchange is a quantity of precious
metal that the community treats as having inherent value.4 The role of
the sovereign in such a system is primarily to control the minting of the
precious metal into coins and to establish the value of coins so minted.
For much of recorded history, the center point of the sovereign's power
over the monetary system was the exclusivity of the power to mint pre-
cious metal into coins, to declare the value of the coins so minted, and to
declare that the coins operated as legal tender at their minted value.5 In
the United States, this fundamental power rests solely with the federal
government under the constitutional provisions that grant to the United
States Congress the power "to coin Money [and] regulate the value
thereof"6 and that deny the states any power to "coin Money; emit Bills
of Credit; [or] make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Pay-
ment of Debts."?
In the modern United States, the only significant category of money in
this narrow sense is paper money.8 The paper money that is treated as
currency is issued by the Federal Reserve Banks under a comprehensive
and complex federal regime directed primarily at the important issue of
public policy posed by control of the money supply.9 From the stand-
point of the law of payment systems, the only really significant legislation
is the provision of federal law making Federal Reserve notes legal
tender.l°
The private law of payment systems for currency is quite simple. If A
wishes to make payment to B by means of currency, all that is required is
a delivery of the currency. At the moment of delivery, the underlying
obligation is satisfied and the recipient of the currency becomes the party
entitled to it. Because the payment transaction is instantaneous, a cur-
rency recipient need not worry about the credit-worthiness of the trans-
feror. By contrast, suppose that A makes payment to B by delivery of a
check. The physical delivery of the check is only the first step of the
3. See generally FREDERICK A. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 1-30 (5th ed.
1992).
4. !d. at 14-19.
5. See generally ALBERT FEAVEARYEAR, THE POUND STERLING: A HISTORY OF EN.
GLISH MONEY (2d ed. 1963).
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. There is a substantial question, now of only historical
interest, about whether the original intent of these constitutional provisions was to prohibit
the federal as well as state governments from issuing legal tender paper money. See Ken-
neth W. Dam, The Legal Tender Cases, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 367.
8. Coins remain legal tender but do not contain any significant quantity of precious
metal. Thus, like paper money, coins' value rests solely on the declaration of the sovereign.
9. See generally BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., THE FEDERAL RE·
SERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 17-59 (8th ed. 1994).
10. 31 U.S.c. § 5103 (2000) ("United States coins and currency (including Federal re-
serve notes and circulating notes of Federal reserve banks and national banks) are legal
tender for all debts, public charges, taxes, and dues. Foreign gold or silver coins are not
legal tender for debts.")
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process. Payment does not occur until after B deposits the check and the
process of check collection is completed. If-and this is a big if-nothing
goes wrong, the collection process results in a debit to A's account at the
payor bank and a credit to B's account at the bank where B deposited the
check. Until that collection process is completed, the person who takes
payment by check runs the risk of the creditworthiness of the person who
makes payment.
A currency recipient also faces little, if any, risk of fraud by the trans-
feror. The rules of property transfer are quite different for currency and
other forms of property. The ordinary rules of personal property transfer
start with the principle that a transferee gets only such title as the trans-
feror had.ll Accordingly, if ordinary personal property is stolen, the
owner can recover it even from one who gave value for the property with-
out notice of adverse claims.l2 By contrast, a person who takes currency
gets good title, even if her claim is traced through a thief. Indeed, that
proposition is so fundamental that it is a bit hard to find a definitive cita-
tion. The usual citation is Miller v. Race.l3 But Miller did not involve
actual currency. Rather, Miller held that Bank of England notes, which
were not at the time formally legal tender, were governed by the same
rules as money itself. Accordingly, the owner of a stolen Bank of En-
gland note could not recover it from a person who innocently received it
for value.
The principle that good title to money can be obtained even by a trans-
fer through a thief is most commonly cited in cases where the issue is
whether the item in question should be governed by the money rules or
the rules for ordinary chattels. For example, in a mid-nineteenth-century
Massachusetts case, a privately minted gold token from the gold rush
days of mid-nineteenth-century California had somehow found its way
back to Massachusetts.l4 The Massachusetts court ruled, however, that it
should be governed by the ordinary chattel rules, not the money rules. I5
By contrast, in a late twentieth-century case, it was held that the money
rules applied to some $500 and $1000 bills that were still outstanding,
even though the United States no longer issues currency in such large
denominations.16
11. RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 9.3 (3d ed. 1975).
12. Id.
13. 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758).
14. Chapman v. Cole, 78 Mass. (12 Gray) 141 (1858).
15. As I have elsewhere observed, the case could be understood as a reflection of "the
ordinary attitude of proper Yankees to the bizarre practices of Californians, [to wit) the
fact that people in California treated it as money didn't make it so." James S. Rogers,
Negotiability, Property, and Identity, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 471, 503 n.81 (1990) [hereinafter
Rogers, Negotiability].
16. City of Portland v. Berry, 739 P.2d 1041 (Or. Ct. App. 1987).
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Most modern payments systems, however, are made by some system
for the transfer of bank credit from one person's bank account to another
person's bank account. Adopting the convenient terminology used in
Uniform Commercial Code ("U.c.c.") Article 4A concerning wholesale
wire transfers, we can describe all such systems as ones in which bank
credit is transferred from the "Originator's" account to the "Benefici-
ary's" accountY Prior to the payment transaction, Originator has a bank
account balance with Originator's Bank, and Beneficiary has a bank ac-
count balance with "Beneficiary's Bank." The goal of the payment trans-
action is to effect a transfer of some portion of that bank credit, or, more
precisely, to reduce the liability of Originator's Bank to Originator and to
make a corresponding increase in the liability of Beneficiary's Bank to
Beneficiary.
The oldest deposit account transfer system in current use is, of course,
the check system. The Originator, or "drawer" in check terminology,18
maintains a checking account with Originator's Bank, the "drawee" or
"payor bank" in check terminology.19 The objective of the check pay-
ment transaction is to transfer some portion of that bank credit from
Originator's account to Beneficiary's account. The process begins with
delivery of the check from drawer to payee. That delivery does not, in
itself, result in any change in the state of the parties' bank accounts.20
The check might or might not be paid, depending, among other things, on
whether it was drawn on sufficient funds and whether the drawer stops
payment. Thus, the payment transaction consists of (1) the immediate
transaction between Originator and Beneficiary and (2) the process of
collection of the check through the banking system. In a simple collec-
tion scenario, Beneficiary (payee) deposits the check in an account at
Beneficiary's Bank (depositary bank). Beneficiary's Bank gives Benefici-
ary provisional credit for the amount of the check at the time of deposit,
but that provisional credit may be revoked if the check is returned.21
Beneficiary's Bank forwards the check to the Originator's Bank. If the
check is drawn on sufficient funds and no other problem is discovered,
17. Article 4A uses two terms-"funds transfer" and "payment order"-to describe a
payment instruction. "Funds transfer" is defined in U.e.e. section 4A-104(a) as the ge-
neric term for the series of transactions that together constitute the intended transfer of
bank credit. "Payment order" is defined in U.e.e. § 4A-103(a)(1) as an instruction given
by one person, be it the user of the system or one of the banks participating in the system,
to the party with which it is in contact directing the recipient to process a part of the funds
transfer. Thus, a "funds transfer" typically consists of a series of "payment orders."
U.e.e. section 4A-104(a) & cmt. 1. "Originator" is defined in U.e.e. section 4A-104(c) as
"the sender of the first payment order in a funds transfer," while "beneficiary" is defined in
U.e.e. § 4A-103(a)(2) as "the person to be paid by the beneficiary's bank." Citations to
the u.e.e. are to the current (2005) version, which includes Article 4A (1989), and the
revised version of Articles 3 and 4 (1990).
18. U.C.e. § 3-103(a)(5).
19. U.e.e. §§ 3-103(a)(4), 4-105(3).
20. u.e.e. § 3-408.
21. u.e.e. §§ 4-201(a), 4-214(a).
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the check is "paid" by the payor bank.22 "Payment," however, does not
really describe a separate step. Rather, payment means only that provi-
sional settlements made for the check on forward collection are not re-
voked.23 The end result is that Beneficiary's account at Beneficiary's
Bank has been credited for the amount of the check, Originator's account
at Originator's Bank has been debited, and accounting entries have been
made to reflect the transfer between Originator's Bank and Beneficiary's
Bank, including in most cases entries on the books of other banks.
One feature that distinguishes the check system from many other de-
posit account transfer systems is that the flow of information and the flow
of funds move in opposite directions. The information directing the funds
transfer is contained on the check, but the check is delivered to the payee,
rather than to the banks involved in the funds transfer. The check moves
from Originator to Beneficiary. Beneficiary then initiates the bank col-
lection process, by depositing the check with its own bank. In the useful
terminology of the ill-fated Uniform New Payments Code ("UNPC"), the
check system deals with "draw orders" that "pull" bank credit to the Ben-
eficiary from the Originator.24
The more recently developed system of wholesale wire transfers, now
governed by u.e.e. Article 4A, shares the feature of the check system
that payment is made by the transfer of bank credit from one account to
another. Unlike the check system, however, the instruction and the flow
of funds move in the same direction.25 Originator gives an instruction not
to Beneficiary, but to Originator's own bank. Originator's Bank then
transmits an instruction, ordinarily through one or more intermediary
banks, to Beneficiary's Bank. By transmitting the instruction to or to-
ward Beneficiary's Bank, Originator's Bank has accepted the Originator's
payment order.26 Upon acceptance by Originator's Bank, Originator be-
comes obligated to Originator's Bank for the amount of the order.27 That
obligation is ordinarily satisfied by a debit to Originator's account with
Originator's Bank.28 In the routine case, Beneficiary's Bank then gives
notice to Beneficiary that the funds transfer has been received.29 At least
by the time that Beneficiary's Bank gives notice to Beneficiary, Benefici-
ary's Bank becomes obligated to Beneficiary.3D Though the flow of infor-
mation differs, the fundamental effect of a wholesale wire funds transfer
is the same as that of a check payment: Originator's bank account with
22. V.e.e. §§ 4-215, 4-301.
23. V.e.e. § 4-215(a)(3) & cmt. 7.
24. See Vnif. New Payments Code § 51 (P.E.B. Draft No.3 1983).
25. The VNPC described these as "pay orders" that "pushed" bank credit. Id.
26. V.e.e. §§ 4A-209(a), 4A-301(a).
27. V.e.e. § 4A-402(c).
28. V.e.e. § 4A-403(a)(3).
29. V.e.e. § 4A-404(b).
30. V.e.e. §§ 4A-404(a), 4A-209(b)(1). In the case of a funds transfer through the
Fedwire system, Beneficiary's Bank has accepted at the moment the order is received from
the relevant Federal Reserve Bank, V.e.e. §§ 4A-403(a)(1), 4A-209(b)(2), so that Benefi-
ciary's Bank becomes obligated to Beneficiary at that time, without regard to the giving of
notice to Beneficiary. V.e.e. § 4A-404(a).
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Originator's Bank is debited and Beneficiary's Bank account with Benefi-
ciary's Bank is credited.
So too, various electronic payment systems that have come into com-
mon use in consumer transactions in the past few decades are, in essence,
systems for making payment by transferring credit from one bank ac-
count to another. Perhaps the most familiar is the use of the automated
clearing house ("ACH") system for direct deposit of payroll where the
system operates by transferring credit from the employer's bank account
to the account of the various employees at their own banks.31 Similarly,
other consumer uses of the ACH system, such as for consumer payments
of recurring bills,32 for representment of dishonored checks,33 for re-
placement of checks by ACH transfers,34 and the like are all systems in
which payment is ultimately made by a transfer from the consumer's
bank account to the bank account of the person receiving payment.
The system for consumer payments that has probably seen the most
explosive use in the past decade is the debit card system. The current
debit card system had its origins in the early 1970s with automated teller
machine ("ATM") cards.35 In recent years, the ATM card system has
evolved into a significant independent payment system, largely as a result
of the success of MasterCard and VISA in piggybacking the use of debit
cards onto the existing infrastructure of the credit card clearance sys-
tem.36 Yet that system, like the check system and various uses of the
ACH system, is still, at root, a system for transferring the amount of the
payment from one bank account to another.
Finally, there is the credit card system.37 Strictly speaking, one might
say that the credit card system is not really a payment system, or not a
complete payment system. When a consumer purchases goods or services
with a credit card, the credit card transaction is completed when the
merchant's account is credited and the issuing bank makes payment. The
user, however, need not make payment until whatever later time is set by
the credit arrangement between the issuer and the cardholder. Indeed,
card issuers fervently hope that the users will not pay promptly but will
instead incur significant finance charges. Perhaps because of the promi-
nence of the credit card system in the United States, other proposed pay-
ment systems, such as for Internet sales and Internet auction payments,
have in recent years developed primarily as adjuncts to the credit card
system, rather than as independent payment systems. For example, the
31. See generally 1 DONALD I. BAKER ET AL., THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC FUND TRANS-
FER SYSTEMS 'lI 5.07 (2004).
32. ld. ch. 4.
33. See Glen R. McCluskey, Electronic Check Transactions: What Law Governs?, 58
BENCH & B. MINN. 25, 28 (Oct. 2001).
34. See id.
35. See 1 BAKER ET AL., supra note 31, at 'lI 6.04.
36. ld. 'lI 7.02.
37. See generally 2 BARKLEY CLARK & BARBARA CLARK, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOS-
ITS, COLLECTIONS AND CREDIT CARDS ch. 15 (2004).
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PayPal® system38 that has become so dominant as a means of paying for
goods purchased in E-Bay® auctions is, in essence, simply a way of ar-
ranging for a payment that will ultimately be made either by a charge to
the user's credit card, or by a charge to the user's bank account.
C. NOTE TRANSFER SYSTEMS
In the modern world, when a bank establishes a credit in favor of a
customer, it does so by entering the amount in an account maintained by
the customer with the bank. The credit might be established either be-
cause the customer has made a deposit or because the bank has agreed to
make a loan to the customer. In either event, the result of the transaction
is a credit to an account maintained by the customer. If the account is a
transaction account, the amount of the bank credit can then be trans-
ferred by any of the available modern systems for transfer of bank credit.
In the early nineteenth century, however, bank operations were con-
ducted in a different fashion. Today, of course, banks do not issue circu-
lating notes. Before the late nineteenth century, however, the issuance of
circulating notes was a standard part of banking.39 When one deposited
money (specie) in a bank account or took out a loan from a bank, one
received notes issued by that bank, not credit in an account at the bank.
The notes were simply promissory notes issued by the bank embodying
the bank's promise to pay the note (in real money, that is, specie) to the
bearer. The person who received such notes from the bank could use
them in making payment for other transactions. Anyone who received
the bank notes could, of course, take them directly to the bank and de-
mand payment in specie. However, so long as people in the community
had confidence in the solvency of the bank, there would be little reason to
do that. The paper bank note was certainly more convenient to carry
around than gold coins. It could be passed along to others as a private
currency. As was said in an early-nineteenth century Delaware case,
"[blank notes constitute a large and convenient part of the currency of
our country, and, by common consent, serve to a great extent all the pur-
poses of coin."40 Indeed, a banker was likely to regard it as an insult for
someone actually to present a note for redemption in specie. As one au-
thority notes, "[I]t had become the habit of bank officers and others to
regard the presentation of notes for redemption in specie as an act to be
reprobated, manifesting a desire to injure the bank and through it the
community where it was located."41 Of course, the proliferation of pri-
vately issued bank notes made it quite difficult to be sure whether a par-
ticular note tendered in payment was genuine or counterfeit. In response
to that problem, weekly "bank note detector" publications were common.
38. See PayPal Homepage, http://www.paypal.com.
39. 1 FRITZ REDLICH, THE MOLDING OF AMERICAN BANKING 10-13 (2d ed. 1968).
40. Corbit v. Bank of Smyrna, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 235, 252 (1837).
41. A. BARTON HEPBURN, A HISTORY OF CURRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES 166
(rev. ed. 1967).
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In the publication, one could find information on which bank had issued
which denominations, which notes were likely to be counterfeits, and
what the market rate of discount was for the circulating notes of various
banks.42
Today, we are so familiar with paper currency that it seems odd that
anyone would have regarded a note issued by an ordinary bank as a me-
dium of exchange. There are at least two ways of getting past that obsta-
cle to understanding the history of payment systems. First, the modern
sense that no one would accept a bank note, to wit, as currency is a prod-
uct of the assumption that there is something better "ordinary" currency
issued by, or under the control of, the government. But the issuance of
legal tender paper money dates only from the time of the Civil War.
Moreover, these Civil War "greenbacks" were not regarded as a desirable
element of a permanent monetary system but as at best a necessary evil
to meet the extraordinary circumstances of the war and at worst a fla-
grant affront to the Constitution, sound public policy, and morality.43
The establishment of anything like the modern managed national cur-
rency system in the United States can be dated only from the National
Bank Act of 186444 or perhaps the Federal Reserve Act of 1913.45 Given
the absence of governmentally controlled paper currency and the difficul-
ties of using specie as a means of payment in anything other than the
smallest transactions, the widespread acceptability of bank notes as a
form of circulating medium can be understood as a product of the lack of
anything better.
A second way of overcoming the sense of oddity that we now feel in
looking at the currency system of the early nineteenth century is to real-
ize that things are not really all that different today, except in form. In
the early nineteenth century, it was obvious that the circulating medium
consisted of notes issued by banks. Today, it is equally the case that the
circulating medium of exchange consists of banks' obligations. The only
difference is that the form has changed. True, banks no longer issue cir-
culating notes. However, demand obligations of banks-in the form of
deposit liabilities in checking accounts-remain the significant medium of
exchange. For example, even the narrowest measure of the money supply
includes not only currency but also demand obligations of commercial
banks, and currency is only a small part of the total volume of the money
supply.46 Economically, the important difference between the modem
currency system and that of the era of circulating bank notes is not the
form of the bank obligations. Rather, the difference is that we have de-
42. BENJAMIN J. KLEBANER, AMERICAN COMMERCIAL BANKING: A HISTORY 18-19
(1990).
43. See generally HEPBURN, supra note 41, chs. XI - XIV; Dam, supra note 7; Hepburn
v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871).
44. 13 Stat. 99 (1864).
45. 38 Stat. 251 (1913).
46. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM:
PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 28 (8th ed. 1994).
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veloped a comprehensive regulatory, supervisory, and insurance system
to minimize the risk that the prospect of bank failure poses to the mone-
tary system.
III. E-NOTE SYSTEMS
Now let us consider the similarities and differences between "electronic
money" systems and the various payment systems for which a relatively
well-settled body of private law has evolved. The initial difficulty one
confronts is a matter of definition and description. It would be fairly easy
to provide specific descriptions of a variety of proposed electronic money
systems. The citations for any such description would consist principally
of URLs for the websites of the developers of the various systems, tout-
ing their advantages. By the time that anyone went to look for those
references, however, the website, along with the system it described, may
well have passed into oblivion.47 Thus, rather than describe any particu-
lar system, it is better to outline, at a fairly high level of generality, the
features of an electronic money system that are particularly relevant from
the perspective of the private law of payment systems.48
A. BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF E-NOTE SYSTEMS
Assume that "Issuer"-which might be a single bank or other entity, or
a grouping of entities related by some form of contract-issues what we
will call "electronic notes" or "E-Notes."49 The E-Notes are not repre-
sented by any definitive piece of paper. They exist only in the form of
some electronic packet of information.
Transferability is the essence of the E-Notes. Issuer engages that it will
pay the amount of the E-Note to any person to whom the E-Note has
been transferred. How a transfer is accomplished may vary depending on
the nature of the system. In a fairly simple "smart-card" system, transfer
might be accomplished by swiping the card through some form of card-
reader at a merchant, with the consequence that the E-Note is then held
by the merchant rather than by the initial owner of the card. In more
complex systems, such as those intended for payments for Internet trans-
actions, transfer of the E-Notes might be accomplished by communica-
tion from one user to another over any form of electronic network,
47. See (pointlessly), e.g., www.digicash.com. former website of now-defunct Digicash
system.
48. A brief description of several of the systems that have been proposed is given in
JANE K. WINN & BENJAMIN WRIGHT, LAW OF ELECfRONIC COMMERCE § 7.04 (4th ed.
2004). One of the best descriptions of electronic money systems is found in ABA Task
Force on Stored-Value Cards, supra note 1.
49. For simplicity, the description herein will speak of a single entity as Issuer. Sys-
tems where a group of entities act as issuers simply require some contract or other arrange-
ment among the entities concerning the extent of liability for E-Notes issued by others.
Also, the use of the term "E-Note" need not be taken to confine the discussion to systems
in which the E-Notes are issued and transferable only in certain set denominations. The
system might just as well permit the user to transfer value in any denomination up to the
amount that has been loaded onto the user's device.
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perhaps with limitations imposed by software or hardware security de-
vices associated with the system.
The system might be limited to single use transactions. That is, once a
user has transferred an E-Note to a recipient, the recipient could obtain
the value only by redeeming the E-Note from Issuer or related entitles.50
But, there is no need to assume that E-Note systems will be limited to
such simple single use transactions. Rather, the system might permit the
recipient of an E-Note to further transfer the E-Note to another user.
Thus, an E-Note might circulate from user to user for an indefinite period
of time before some user chooses to convert its value into some other
form by presenting it to Issuer for redemption.
The key feature of any E-Note system is that it would permit real-time
final transfers of the bank credit (or the credit of a non-bank issuer) rep-
resented by the E-Note by transactions that could be effected through a
communication system outside the banking system. The transaction in
which the E-Note is transferred from one user to another user would be
both the beginning and the end of the payment transaction. Unlike the
current check, credit card, or debit card systems, the user to user transac-
tion would not simply be a way in which an instruction is given that will
initiate a transfer of bank credit that is actually effected by some other set
of transactions in the settlement process. Rather, once the user to user
transaction has been effected, the transmitting user would no longer be
the beneficiary of the issuing entity's credit represented by the E-Note,
and the receiving user would, at that instant, become the beneficiary of
the issuing entity's credit.
B. Do OTHER PAYMENT SYSTEM STATUTES ApPLY TO E-
NOTE SYSTEMS?
At one time, it appeared that the American law of payment systems
might move toward the development of a comprehensive statutory frame-
work that would cover all forms of payment systems. However, the effort
to develop a comprehensive Uniform New Payments Code encountered
significant political obstacles, and was abandoned in the 1980s.51 Thus,
for the foreseeable future, various specific statutory regimes will apply to
specific payment systems. Thus, the check system is governed by Articles
3 and 4 of the u.c.c., the wholesale wire-transfer system by Article 4A of
the U.c.c., the consumer debit card system by the Federal Electronic
Funds Transfer Act,52 and the credit card system by certain provisions in
50. Redemption could be processed through some other funds transfer system, such as
a wholesale wire transfer, credit to an account maintained by the recipient with the Issuer
or a related entity, or even payment of the value by a paper instrument such as a check.
51. For a brief account of the history of the ill-fated Uniform New Payments Code
project, and its transformation into the more limited project for addition of Article 4A on
wholesale wire funds transfers and revision of Articles 3 and 4, see Fred H. Miller, u.c.c.
Articles 3, 4 and 4A: A Study in Process and Scope, 42 ALA. L. REV. 405 (1991).
52. Electronic Funds Transfer Act §§ 901-20, 15 U.S.c. §§ 1693-93r (2000); Federal
Reserve System Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. §§ 205.1-205.17 (2005).
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the Federal Consumer Credit Protection ACt.53
In considering whether any of these existing bodies of statutory law
might apply to an E-Note system, it is useful to distinguish three phases in
the life of an E-Note: (1) issuance, (2) transfer, and (3) redemption. It is
the second phase that presents significant new legal issues. Those are
discussed in more detail below. The first and third phases present only
legal issues that are either already governed by existing, well-settled law
or are so closely analogous to well-settled issues that they require only
the application of familiar principles to a slight variant of traditional pay-
ment arrangements.
1. Issuance
Existing commercial law already covers the initial phase of the acquisi-
tion of E-Notes. A user might get E-Notes by means of any existing pay-
ment system, for example, currency, check, or electronic funds transfer.
If some dispute arises concerning a transaction in which E-Notes are ac-
quired, the law governing the payment system used will apply. Suppose
that E-Notes are acquired with currency that turns out to have been sto-
len. The law governing currency will determine whether the owner of the
currency can assert a claim against the E-Notes. If E-Notes are acquired
with a check and the check turns out to bear a forged drawer's signature
or a forged indorsement, or if any other dispute arises concerning the
funds transfer initiated by the check, the dispute will be governed by the
law of checks, as codified in Articles 3 and 4 of the u.e.e. So too, if E-
Notes are acquired by an electronic funds transfer from a deposit account
maintained by the user, disputes concerning that phase of the transaction
would be governed by the existing law of electronic funds transfers. In
short, the fact that a particular traditional payment device is used to ac-
quire E-notes makes no difference to the commercial analysis of a dispute
about the operation of that traditional payment device. The situation is
no different than if the traditional payment device were used to acquire
any other product or service offered by a bank, be it E-notes, securities
that the bank sells as a dealer, or commemorative t-shirts sold by the
bank's public relations department.
This addresses one of the major risks of loss faced by a user of any E-
Note system. The design of the E-Note system might permit a user to
access a traditional deposit account by electronic means to download
value in the form of E-Notes. In this use, the system could permit the
user unlimited access to all funds on deposit in the account, and hence
expose the user to unlimited risk of loss from an unauthorized use.54
However, the fact that a bank depositor accesses the deposit account
through the E-Note system has no bearing on the law that governs the
53. Truth in Lending Act §§ 132-34, 15 u.S.C §§ 1642-44 (2000).
54. Note that because the bank maintaining the deposit account could permit the user
to overdraw the deposit account, the potential exposure is not even limited to the amount
on deposit. Cf. V.CC § 4-401(a), (b).
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user's liability for an unauthorized transfer from the deposit account.
Rather, that issue is governed by existing law on electronic funds
transfers.
If the E-Note system is linked to a deposit account that is "established
primarily for personal, family, or household use,"55 a transfer of funds
from that account to the E-Note system would constitute an "electronic
fund transfer"56 governed by the Federal Electronic Fund Transfer Act57
and its implementing regulation, Federal Reserve System Regulation E.58
Thus, this aspect of the E-Note system should be treated in the same
fashion as any other consumer electronic funds transfer product offered
by the bank that maintains the account, such as a telephone bill payment
service or a home banking system. The principal substantive conse-
quences would be that the initial disclosure requirements, error resolu-
tion procedures, and limits on liability for unauthorized transfers of the
Regulation E ("Reg E") regime would apply. However, the individual
transaction documentation provisions, which require paper receipts for
ATM and debit card POS transactions, should not apply.59
Thus, with respect to the most serious possibility for consumer loss
through the E-Note system-loss of funds held in a linked deposit ac-
count-existing law already resolves the matter. Under Reg E, a con-
sumer user's liability for an unauthorized transfer from a linked deposit
account to E-Notes would be limited to $50, or $500 if the consumer user
fails to make a timely report of the loss of the access device, or unlimited
liability if the consumer user fails to make a timely report of an unautho-
rized transfer that has been reported to the consumer on a periodic
statement.6D
If the E-Note system is linked to a deposit account that is not "estab-
lished primarily for personal, family, or household use," a transfer of
funds from that account to E-Notes would constitute a "funds transfer"
governed by ne.e. Article 4A.61 As is the case with respect to the trans-
fer value from a consumer's bank account into E-Notes, the principal
55. 15 U.S.c. § 1693a(2) (2000).
56. [d. § 1693a(6).
57. Electronic Fund Transfer Act §§ 901-20, 15 U.S.c. §§ 1693-93r (2000).
58. Federal Reserve System Regulation E, 12 c.F.R. §§ 205.1-205.17 (2005).
59. The Reg E transaction documentation requirements, 12 C.F.R. § 205.9(a) (2005),
apply only to an electronic fund transfer that is initiated through an "electronic terminal."
"Electronic terminal" is defined in Reg E as "an electronic device, other than a telephone
operated by a consumer, through which a consumer may initiate an electronic fund trans-
fer. The term includes, but is not limited to, point-of-sale terminals, automated teller ma-
chines, and cash dispensing machines." 12 C.F.R. § 205.2(h) (2005). The Board has
indicated in an Official Staff Interpretation that the exclusion of transactions initiated by a
"telephone operated by a consumer" will also cover "a transfer by a means analogous in
function to a telephone, such as by home banking equipment or a facsimile machine." 12
C.F.R. Supp. I to Part 205 § 205.2(h) (2005).
60. 12 C.F.R. § 205.6 (2005).
61. The Article 4A analysis would be as follows: The commercial E-Note user would
be the "originator," u.c.c. § 4A-104(c), who transmits a "payment order," U.c.e. § 4A-
103(a)(I), to the bank that maintains the account, qua "originator's bank," U.c.e. § 4A-
104(d), directing that same bank, qua "beneficiary's bank," u.C.C. § 4A-I03(a)(3), to
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consequence of the fact that a similar transaction by a commercial user is
covered by u.c.c. Article 4A is that there is already an established body
of law that addresses the most serious risk of loss in the E-Note system-
the risk of an unauthorized use of a linked money module to drain the
commercial user's ordinary deposit account. Article 4A establishes a loss
allocation regime based on the concept of a "commercially reasonable
security procedure." In rough form, the result of the Article 4A loss allo-
cation rules is that if the bank makes available a commercially reasonable
security procedure for testing the authenticity of payment orders, and the
unauthorized instruction passes the security procedure, then the customer
bears the loss unless the customer is able to prove that the unauthorized
order was not caused by a breach of security within the customer's own
organization.62
2. Redemption
The final phase in the life of an E-Note would be the step of presenting
E-Notes to the issuer for redemption. This aspect of the system raises
issues that are closely analogous to, though probably much simpler than,
the process of collection of other payment media such as checks.
To be sure, if the E-Note system is most commonly used by persons
who have established links to deposit accounts and routinely deposit E-
Notes received by them into their linked deposit accounts, users may
come to think of their relationship with the bank where they maintain
their linked account as a key element of their use of the E-Note system.
Indeed, merchants or others who are primarily recipients of E-Notes
rather than transferors of E-Notes may care more about their legal rights
make a payment to the same customer, qua "beneficiary," V.e.e. § 4A-103(a)(2), in the
form of E-Notes.
The fact that the funds transfer is from the user to itself does not preclude application of
Article 4A. The Official Comment explicitly notes this possibility. "In some cases the
originator and the beneficiary may be the same person. This will occur, for example, when
a corporation orders a bank to transfer funds from an account of the corporation in that
bank to another account of the corporation in that bank or in some other bank." u.e.e.
§ 4A-104 cmt. 1,91 6.
Although the usual Article 4A funds transfer is one in which the amount of the transfer
is debited to one bank account and credited to another account, applicability of Article 4A
does not require that the payment order direct that funds are to be credited to an account
maintained by the beneficiary. Rather, the definition of "payment order," which is the key
element in determining the coverage of Article 4A, requires only that the instruction direct
the receiving bank to "pay, or cause another bank to pay, a fixed or determinable amount
of money to a beneficiary." V.e.e. § 4A-103(a)(1). One might wonder whether an in-
struction directing a bank to load value in the form of an E-Note constitutes a direction to
"pay ... money." Note, however, that even in the archetypal Article 4A transaction, the
result of the transfer is not actually a payment of "money" in the narrowest sense of deliv-
ery of legal tender, but is merely credit to the beneficiary's account, that is, the establish-
ment of a relationship in which a bank becomes obligated to pay an amount of money. If,
as must be the case, a direction to credit a bank account is a direction to "pay ... money"
within the meaning of V.e.e. section 4A-103(a)(1), it is hard to see why a direction to
download E-Notes would not also be a direction to "pay ... money." In both cases, the
end result is that the beneficiary becomes creditor of a bank and could, though rarely
would, enforce that credit claim by demanding legal tender.
62. V.e.e. §§ 4A-201 to 4A-203.
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against their own bank than their rights against the bank that issued the
specific E-Note. Yet, this aspect of the relationship is easily assimilated
to traditional law governing deposit and collection of items in deposit
accounts. Moreover, this aspect of the system could be created by tradi-
tional bilateral agreements between the bank maintaining the deposit ac-
count and its customer.
Several possible models of the E-Note collection process might be
adopted. At one extreme, the system might be structured in the fashion
that only the issuing bank undertakes to pay the amount of the note. If a
user transferred an E-Note to its own bank for collection, the governing
agreement between the user and the bank might provide that any credit
given for the deposited E-Note is provisional and may be revoked or re-
covered if the particular E-Note is not paid, e.g., because the issuing bank
has failed. Agreements among banks through whom an E-Note passed in
the collection process could be structured in the same fashion.
It might, however, be economically feasible for banks to offer irrevoca-
ble credit for E-Notes deposited with them for collection, even though
the collecting bank is not itself the issuing bank of that E-Note. Unlike
the check collection system in which a collecting bank has no way of
knowing whether a specific check will be paid by the drawee upon pre-
sentment, it should be possible for any bank taking an E-Note for collec-
tion to know, by virtue of the security system information encoded in the
E-Note, that it does represent an obligation of the issuing bank. Accord-
ingly, it should be entirely feasible for the agreement between a bank and
a customer to provide that any credit given by the bank for an E-Note
received by the bank for collection is irrevocable.
Indeed, it may be feasible for a bank that has established a relationship
with its own customer for collection of E-Notes to offer an even greater
degree of assurance. A collecting bank might agree with its customer, in
advance, that it will give irrevocable credit for any E-Notes that the cus-
tomer receives via a transfer that passes muster under the security sys-
tems associated with the E-Note system. Such an arrangement might be
desirable if there are multiple issuers of E-Notes, because the undertak-
ing of the collecting bank to its customer would make it feasible for the
customer to accept E-Notes without an individual credit decision about
each issuer. With such an agreement from its own bank, the user
would-at the instant that its system accepts an E-Note-effectively have
a claim not only against the issuing bank, but also against its own chosen
bank. In that fashion, the E-Note system would replicate one of the de-
sirable features of traditional bank wire transfers, in that a person receiv-
ing payment would give up its claim against the person making payment
only at the moment that the person receives a claim against its own cho-
sen bank.63
63. A payment by wire transfer discharges the underlying obligation at the time that a
payment order is accepted by the beneficiary's bank. V.e.e. § 4A-406. That is also the
moment at which the beneficiary obtains a claim against its own bank. u.e.e. § 4A-404.
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Implementation of any of these models of the relationship between a
user and a collecting bank should be entirely feasible by private agree-
ment. As a matter of substantive law, any of the models described above
is fully consistent with general principles implemented by specific statutes
for other payment systems. Although, as noted below, u.e.e. Article 4
would not apply of its own force to an arrangement between a user and a
bank that took E-Notes for collection, it does provide a useful source of
analogy. Under Article 4, the default rule is that a depositary or other
collecting bank can recover from its customer any value given for an in-
strument if the instrument is not ultimately paid, but that rule is subject
to variation by agreement.64 Thus, an analogy to Article 4 would support
the enforceability of agreements between collecting banks and E-Note
users concerning the extent to which the collecting bank agrees to give
irrevocable credit for E-Notes.65
3. Transfer
The key phase in the life cycle of an E-Note is the stage of transferring
of the E-Note from one user to another. Since that transfer occurs en-
tirely within the E-Note system, it poses far more difficult issues than the
phases of issuance or redemption. Let us consider whether any existing
framework of payment system law would apply to the transfer of E-Notes
from one user to another.
a. U.e.e. Articles 3 and 4
U.e.e. Article 3 governs traditional negotiable instruments, including
checks, drafts, and promissory notes. The scope of Article 3 is deter-
mined by the definition of "negotiable instrument" which requires that
there be a signed, written promise or order for the payment of a fixed
amount of money and that the promise or order be, with certain narrow
exceptions, unconditional and unaffected by any other agreement. The
requirement that an Article 3 instrument be a signed writing would ex-
clude an electronic representation of value such as an E-Note.66
u.e.e. Article 4 deals with the process of collection of checks and
other items through the banking system. The coverage of Article 4 is set
by the definition of the term "item." Although "item" is a somewhat
broader term than the Article 3 concept of "negotiable instrument," the
most natural reading of the scope provisions indicate that Article 4 is
64. V.e.e. §§ 4-103, 4-201, 4-214.
65. The provisions of the original version of Article 4 on the revocability of provisional
credits have been applied to the credit card system with respect to credit given by merchant
banks to their customers for deposited credit card slips. 2 CLARK & CLARK, supra note 37,
at 'll 15.02[4][b][ii]. Presumably courts would follow the same approach even under the
1990 revised version of Article 4 which explicitly excludes credit card slips from the defini-
tion of "item" in section 4-104(a)(9).
66. The possible relevance of digital signature legislation is considered infra text ac-
companying notes 192-94.
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limited to paper items.67 Accordingly, Article 4 would not of its own
force apply to the transfer of E-Notes.
b. u.e.e. Article 4A
u.e.e. Article 4A sets out a comprehensive body of commercial law
designed for transactions of the sort commonly referred to as wholesale
level electronic funds transfers.68 The key provision setting the scope of
Article 4A is "payment order," defined in section 4A-103(a)(1) as:
1. "an instruction of a sender to a receiving bank,"
2. "transmitted orally, electronically, or in writing,"
3. "to pay, or to cause another bank to pay, a fixed or determinable
amount of money to a beneficiary"
4. which "does not state a condition to payment to the beneficiary
other than time of payment"
5. in an arrangement in which "the receiving bank is to be reim-
bursed by debiting an account of, or otherwise receiving payment
from, the sender"
6. and "the instruction is transmitted by the sender directly to the
receiving bank or to an agent, funds-transfer system, or communi-
cation system for transmittal to the receiving bank."
The first and sixth requirements together limit the coverage of Article 4A
to systems in which payments are made by a transfer effected through the
banking system. Although Article 4A could apply to virtually any pay-
ment arrangement implemented by a communication flow that proceeds
from (1) the person making payment to a bank, (2) from that bank to
another bank, and (3) from a bank to the person to receive payment,69
the payment flow in an E-Note system would be different. The flow
would run (1) from the banking system to the person making payment,
thence (2) directly to the person receiving payment, thence (3) either to
another person outside the banking system or back to the banking sys-
tem. Thus, the transfer of an E-Note would not fall within the Article 4A
67. "Item" is defined as "an instrument or a promise or order to pay money handled
by a bank for collection or payment." U.e.e. § 4-104(a)(9). The terms "instrument," "or-
der," and "promise" in the definition of "item" are used in the senses defined in Article 3.
U.e.e. § 4-104(c). The terms "order" and "promise" are defined as "a written [instruction/
undertaking] to pay money signed by the person giving the [instruction/undertaking]."
U.e.e. § 3-103(a)(8), (12).
68. A somewhat complex set of provisions effectively limit Article 4A to "business" as
distinguished from "consumer" electronic fund transfers. U.e.e. section 4A-108 excludes
from Article 4A funds transfers any part of which are governed by Reg E, which applies to
electronic transfers to or from an account "established primarily for personal family or
household purposes," 12 e.F.R. § 205.2(b)(2005), however, another provision excludes
"any transfer of funds through Fedwire or through a similar wire transfer system that is
used primarily for transfers between financial institutions or between businesses." 12
e.F.R. § 205.3(c)(3) (2005).
69. Although the typical transactions covered by Article 4A are in fact implemented
by electronic means, the coverage of Article 4A is not limited to electronic transfers. The
instruction from the paying user to the bank, from one bank to another bank, and from
that bank to the receiving user could be implemented by letters written with quill pens on
parchment and transmitted by carrier pigeon, yet the transaction would still be subject to
Article 4A. U.e.e. § 4A-104 cmt. 6.
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definition of a "payment order" because an E-Note transfer occurs en-
tirely outside the banking system rather than by an instruction directed to
a bank.
c. Federal Electronic Funds Transfer Act and Regulation E
The Federal Electronic Funds Transfer Act,70 and its implementing ad-
ministrative regulation, Federal Reserve System Regulation E,n deal
with the rights of consumers against banks concerning electronically im-
plemented payments from or to their bank accounts.72 (The statute and
implementing regulations are herein collectively referred to by the com-
mon shorthand "Reg E.") The typical transactions governed by Reg E
are ATM transactions, debit card POS payments, and direct deposit of
payroll or other benefit payments. The main substantive consequences of
the applicability of Reg E are standardized disclosure requirements,
transaction and account documentation requirements, and rules that, in
most circumstances, limit a consumer's liability for unauthorized transac-
tions to $50.73
The likely analysis of consumer uses of an E-Note system under Reg E
is similar to the analysis of non-consumer uses under u.e.e. Article 4A.
As noted above, Reg E would apply to the stage of issuance of an E-Note
if a consumer used some electronic means to download value in the form
of E-Notes from a consumer deposit account. By contrast, Reg E should
not apply to the transfer of E-Notes from one user to another.
Reg E applies to "any electronic fund transfer that authorizes a finan-
cial institution to debit or credit a consumer's account."74 The term
"electronic fund transfer" is defined as "any transfer of funds that is initi-
ated through an electronic terminal, telephone, computer, or magnetic
tape for the purpose of ordering, instructing, or authorizing a financial
institution to debit or credit an account."75 A transaction in which the
customer makes payment by transferring the E-Note to another user
could fall within definition of "electronic fund transfer" only if the value
held in the form of E-Notes was itself an "account" so that the transmis-
sion of an E-Note from the transmitting user effected a "debit ... to an
account."
70. 15 U.S.c. § 1693-93r (2000).
71. 12 C.F.R. Part 205 (2005).
72. Reg E plays a role for consumer electronic funds transfer that is somewhat akin to
the role played by u.c.e. Article 4A for non-consumer transactions. The parallel is some-
what rough, inasmuch as Article 4A establishes a comprehensive system of rules governing
the rights and duties of participants at all stages of a payment transaction within its scope,
while Reg E deals only with a limited range of issues concerning the relationship between a
consumer user and the bank with which the consumer maintains an arrangement for elec-
tronic funds transfers.
73. 12 C.F.R. § 205.6 (2005). A consumer who fails promptly to report the loss of an
access device may face liability up to $500, and a consumer who fails promptly to report an
unauthorized transaction shown on a account statement may face unlimited liability. [d.
74. [d. § 205.3(a).
75. [d. § 205.3(b).
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The concept of an "account" or "deposit account" plays a crucial role
in many regulatory and commercial provisions concerning banking and
payment systems. For example, the statutory provisions that determine
which bank liabilities are covered by Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion ("FDIC") or similar insurance systems are generally tied to the con-
cept of a deposit account.76 So too, Reg E covers only those payment
systems that result in a "debit or credit to a consumer's account."77
From the ordinary meaning of the term "account," as well as from the
particular usage in banking and payments statutes, it should be possible
to identify at least two minimum criteria for classification of an arrange-
ment as a "deposit account." First, from the core etymological sense of
the term "account" as a matter of "counting," it seems reasonable to as-
sume that a relationship cannot be an "account" unless it is possible for
the financial institution to "count it." That is, the dollar amount of the
bank's liability must be determinable from the bank's records. Second, as
used in banking and payments law, the concept of a deposit account is
invariably associated with the notion that the bank liability in question is
owed to a particular person. Thus, the concept of a deposit account
seems to assume that the bank's own records would permit the bank to
determine the amount of its obligation to each particular customer.
Even these minimal elements of the concept of a deposit account
should exclude E-Notes. The central feature of an E-Note system is that
it permits a user to transfer value by a transaction effected without con-
tacting the banking system. Even if a bank that had issued E-Notes did
so only in arrangements in which the identity of the particular users had
been disclosed to the bank-as need not be the case depending on the
system design-that would mean only that the bank's records would iden-
tify the initial holders of the E-Notes. The bank would have no way of
knowing to whom those E-Notes had been transferred. Thus, it would
not be possible for the bank to determine, in real time, the identity of the
persons to whom it owed particular amounts represented by the E-Notes
that it had issued. Accordingly, for accounting purposes, the liability of a
bank that had issued E-Notes would have to be recorded on the books of
the bank as an undifferentiated liability account for all outstanding E-
Notes issued by that bank.
Banking and payment system regimes that use the concept of deposit
account contemplate not merely that a bank be able to determine the
aggregate of its liabilities to all customers, but that it be able to determine
the amount owed to a particular customer. For example, FDIC insurance
is limited to a certain dollar figure per account, not to an aggregate
76. In general, the term "deposit" as used in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion Act covers "the unpaid balance of money or its equivalent received or held by a
bank ... in the usual course of business and for which it has given or is obligated to give
credit, either conditionally or unconditionally, to a commercial, checking, savings, time, or
thrift account ...." 12 U.s.c. § 1813(/)(1) (2000).
77. Electronic Fund Transfers Act § 903(6), 15 U.S.c. § 1693a(6) (2000); Federal Re-
serve Board Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. § 205.3(a) (2005).
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amount owed by the bank to all similar claimants. But if E-Notes were
regarded as insured deposits, there would be no way to determine in ad-
vance the extent of the FDIC's potential liability, because the amount of
E-Notes held by individual potential claimants would not be determina-
ble. With respect to Reg E, that regulation applies only to "accounts"
maintained for personal, family, or household use. In an E-Note system,
E-Notes would pass freely among users, some of who might hold the
value for personal, family, or household use, while others would hold the
value for business purposes. There would, however, be no way for a bank
that had issued E-Notes to determine whether the obligation represented
by a particular E-Note was held by a consumer or by a business entity.
Indications from regulatory authorities with respect to the classification
of other new forms of payment systems are generally consistent with the
conclusion that E-Notes would not be covered by statutes governing de-
posit accounts. In 1996, the FDIC issued a General Counsel's Opinion
discussing various forms of stored-value card point-of-sale payment de-
vices.78 The Opinion concludes that stored-value card systems in which
the obligation of the issuing bank is not recorded as a liability to a specific
customer, but is carried as a general liability account to be paid out to
whomever presents the device for collection, would not be insured
deposits.
The Federal Reserve Board ("Board") has given somewhat less clear
guidance on its views of the potential scope of the concept of "account"
as used in Reg E. In May 1996, the Board published for comment a set of
proposed regulations on the application of Reg E to stored-value cards.79
The Board suggested that stored-value cards might be divided into three
categories: "off-line accountable," "off-line unaccountable," and "on-
line."80 The Board's suggestions concerning the treatment of "off-line
unaccountable" and "on-line" stored-value system are unsurprising and
are fully consistent with the analysis offered above. The Board indicated
that an "off-line unaccountable" system, in which the stored-value card
itself contains the only record of the value and the card is used without
any communication to a bank, would not be subject to Reg E because it
does not result in a debit to an account. By contrast, an "on-line" system
in which the card is used only by communication to the bank, would be
subject to Reg E because the card would merely be a means of instructing
78. FDIC, General Counsel's Opinion No.8; Stored Value Cards, 61 Fed. Reg. 40490
(Aug. 2, 1996). As is common in such discussions, the term "stored value card" is used
without any precise definition, but the discussion indicates that the products contemplated
are primarily those directed at the retail, point-of-sale market.
The FDIC opinion indicates that "While this opinion addresses stored value cards, the
Legal Division believes that in general the principles discussed herein would apply equally
to stored value computer network payments products." 61 Fed. Reg. at 40490.
79. Federal Reserve Board, Electronic Fund Transfers Proposed Rule, 61 Fed. Reg.
19696 (1996). As with the FDIC General Counsel Opinion, the Federal Reserve Board
rules seem to contemplate primarily retail point-of-sale systems but indicate that similar
principles might apply to computer network products.
80. 61 Fed. Reg. at 19699.
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the bank to debit the customer's account. It is, however, far less clear
what the Board meant by its suggestions concerning the category it
termed "off-line accountable" and far less clear whether the Board's sug-
gestions are actually supported by the statutory language.
The Board seemed to be suggesting-though its language was rather
guarded and hesitant-that if a smart-card system were structured in such
fashion that it would be possible for the bank maintaining the system to
reconstruct, at least periodically, the state of value held by individual
cards, then the system might be subject to Reg E.81 The Board gave little
persuasive explanation for this conclusion, merely asserting that the cir-
cumstances that "transactions are traceable to the individual card" and
that "the consumer has the right to draw upon funds held by an institu-
tion ... strongly parallels the functioning of a deposit account."82 Just
what this "parallel" might be is a bit difficult to see. An arrangement in
which a bank cannot determine who its creditor is and cannot determine
the amount of its debt to any particular person who might or might not be
its creditor, seems remarkably unlike a deposit account.
Whether anything will come of the Board's concept of an "off-line ac-
countable" system remains to be seen. After some adverse commentary
suggesting that the Board's regulatory proposals on stored-value cards
might be premature, Congress enacted legislation prohibiting the Board
from taking any final action on these proposed regulations until after the
completion and submission to Congress of a study of the desirability of
regulation and possible market-based alternatives to regulation.83 The
Board submitted its report in March 1997,84 but the report studiously
avoids giving any indication of the Board's intentions with respect to the
proposed regulations. Nothing has happened since then, so the issue of
potential Reg E coverage of E-Note systems may well be regarded, for
the nonce, as a dead issue.
81. The relevant passage reads as follows:
In some stored-value systems, the balance of funds available is recorded on
the card, but is also maintained at a central data facility at a bank or else-
where. The systems operate off-line; there is no authorization of transactions
by communication with a database at a financial institution or elsewhere.
Transaction data are periodically transmitted to and maintained by a data
facility. As in the case of the traditional consumer deposit account accessed
by a debit card, in these stored-value card systems a consumer has the right
to draw upon funds held by an institution. The maintenance of a record of
value and of transactions for a given card apart from the card itself-so that
transactions are traceable to the individual card-strongly parallels the func-
tioning of a deposit account. The Board believes that the facts support a
finding that such systems involve an account for purposes of the EFTA.




83. Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208 § 2601.
84. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, REPORT TO CON-
GRESS ON THE ApPLICATION OF THE ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER ACT TO ELECTRONIC
STORED-VALUE PRODUCTS (1997).
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D. THE LAW OF BANK NOTES AS A SOURCE OF LAW FOR E-NoTES
The conclusion that no modern statutory law of payment systems
would, of its own force, apply to an E-Note system is commonly regarded
as meaning that the courts would be confronted with a wholly new task in
dealing with cases that might arise if an E-Note system is put into place.
That conclusion, however, overlooks another well-established body of
law-the law of circulating bank notes.
As has been noted, the essence of an E-Note system is that the issuer of
the E-Note (whether a bank or other entity) has undertaken to pay a
designated amount either to the party to whom the E-Note was originally
issued or to any party to whom the E-Note is transferred. The whole
point of the device-from the standpoint of both the issuer and the
users-is that the E-Note will be used as a medium of exchange. The
central feature of the system is that the obligation of the issuer is owed to
any person to whom the E-Note has been transferred, so that immedi-
ately upon transfer, without any further settlement or other communica-
tion to the banking system, the transferee user becomes the beneficiary of
the obligation of the issuer, and the transferor user no longer has that
right.
Is that a novel device? Hardly. The central description of an E-Note
system is exactly the same as that of the system that was well-established
in the United States in the first half of the nineteenth century-the sys-
tem of circulating bank notes. The only difference is that, in the early
nineteenth-century system, the bank notes took the form of writings,
while in an E-Note system, the notes would take the form of some elec-
tronic embodiment of information. It is far from clear why the difference
in the medium in which the obligation is embodied should matter to the
governing law, or, at least, it is far from clear that the difference in the
medium means that the pre-existing law of circulating paper notes can
simply be ignored in working toward a legal regime for circulating E-
Notes. The Anglo-American system of private law is, after all, a system
built on precedent. In such a system, the fact that the law of circulating
bank notes is relatively old cannot, in itself, count as a reason for conclud-
ing that that body of law has no relevance to modern transactions.
It appears, then, that lawyers planning E-Note systems, as well as
courts called upon to adjudicate disputes concerning E-Notes, cannot
simply ignore the established case law concerning similar forms of pay-
ment systems, particularly the nineteenth-century case law of circulating
bank notes. The following sections of this paper consider several such
issues, specifically (1) whether an E-Note would be "legal tender;" (2)
whether adverse claims could be asserted to an E-Note; (3) whether the
transfer of an E-Note discharges the underlying obligation for which it is
given; and (4) what the consequences are if an E-Note that has been
transferred as a means of payment turns out to have been counterfeit.
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The first legal issue concerning E-Notes that warrants discussion, if
only to eliminate confusion, is whether an E-Note would constitute
"money" in the sense of "legal tender." One sometimes sees discussions
suggesting that a significant disclosure issue would be raised by marketing
statements comparing stored-value cards to cash, on the grounds that the
value represented by a stored-value card is not legal tender.85 It is a bit
hard to see why that is a problem. In the United States, the only legal
tender is currency, that is, coin and Federal Reserve Notes.86 Virtually no
modern payment system involves transfer of legal tender. But little of
consequence turns on whether a certain payment device is legal tender.87
To say that an item is legal tender is to say that a debtor who proposes
to satisfy an obligation by delivery of the item is entitled to do so. The
emphasis on the term "debtor" is significant. The concept of legal tender
does not determine whether a provider of goods or services is obligated
to take a certain payment device. Saying that an item is legal tender
means only that a person who has incurred a debt can discharge it by
tendering the item. Legal tender has nothing to do with whether such a
debt has been incurred.
A merchant would have an obligation to accept a certain payment de-
vice in exchange for goods or services only if (1) the merchant had some
duty derived from other law to deal on ordinary terms with all comers
and (2) payment with the device in question counts as ordinary terms for
purposes of such a duty. Neither of these questions has anything to do
with the concept of legal tender.
The case law that purportedly deals with whether something is or is not
legal tender reflects a good deal of confusion on this basic point. A good
example is Nemser v. New York City Transit Authority.88 Several gadfly
plaintiffs brought a declaratory judgment action challenging the policy of
the New York City Transit Authority that dollar bills would not be ac-
cepted as payment for bus fare. The plaintiffs said that the policy violated
the federal statute making dollar bills legal tender. Not surprisingly, the
court dismissed the case, concluding that the Transit Authority's policy
was reasonable. The court, however, seemed to think that the case in-
volved interpretation of the federal statute making dollar bills legal
tender. In reality, no such issue was presented.
85. See Mark. E. Budnitz, Stored Value Cards and The Consumer: The Need For Regu-
lation, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1027, 1036, 1061-62 (1997).
86. 31 U.S.C § 5103 (2000) ("United States coins and currency (including Federal re-
serve notes and circulating notes of Federal reserve banks and national banks) are legal
tender for all debts, public charges, taxes, and dues.")
87. A fair number of the cases purportedly dealing with whether something is or is not
legal tender involve quixotic efforts by tax protestors asserting such arguments as that
taxes are unlawful if the taxing authority permits them to be paid in anything other than
gold or silver. See, e.g., Walton v. Keirn, 694 P.2d 1287 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); Herald v.
Idaho, 691 P.2d 1255 (Idaho 1984); Parsons v. Idaho, 745 P.2d 300, 307 (Idaho Ct. App.
1987).
88. 530 N.Y.S. 2d 493 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988).
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Imagine that a prospective bus rider seeks to board a bus. The bus
driver says that the fare must be paid. The prospective rider tenders a
dollar bill. The bus driver refuses, saying only tokens or coins are accept-
able means of payment. Stop the action right at this point. Can the pro-
spective bus rider state a claim based on the legal tender statute? No.
The bus rider is not a person who has incurred a debt and seeks to dis-
charge it by tender of something that might or might not be legal tender.
Rather the prospective bus rider is someone who wants to purchase a
service. The question is whether the bus company is obligated to sell that
service in exchange for the medium of payment that is tendered.
To see the point more clearly, suppose that the prospective seller of
goods or services is a purely private entity. Suppose further that the
seller's policy on what it will accept as payment is quite bizarre. Suppose
I place an advertisement in the newspaper that I have a car for sale for
$8000. Someone comes to look at it and wants to buy it. I say OK, but
only if payment is made by delivering 80,000 dimes to me. The prospec-
tive buyer offers to pay in cash, with 80 $100-bills, 160 $50-bills, 400 $20-
bills, 800 $lO-bills, 1600 $5-bills, or even 8000 $1-bills. I politely refuse,
saying it's either 80,000 dimes or no car. Have I violated the legal tender
statute? Clearly not. It was my car, and I am free to do with it as I wish,
including imposing idiotic stipulations on the terms on which I will sell it.
The legal tender statute has nothing to do with whether I am or am not
obligated to sell my car, or the terms on which I am willing to sell the car.
The Nemser case is, of course, somewhat different because the seller of
services in that case was a public transit authority rather than a private
individual. A municipality or other public authority may well have an
obligation to provide service on reasonable terms and without discrimina-
tion to all persons who wish to do business with it.89 That obligation may
well preclude a public utility from refusing to do business on bizarre
terms, but that duty would permit the utility to establish reasonable
terms. Thus, while there may be an obligation on a public utility such as
the transit authority in Nemser to provide service on reasonable terms,
that duty is a flexible one, and, in any event, has nothing to do with the
legal tender statutes.
Even within its proper limited scope, the concept of legal tender has
relatively little practical significance. Suppose, for example, that Debtor
owes Creditor $1000. When the debt comes due, Debtor tenders to Cred-
itor one $1000 Federal Reserve Note. Creditor, having never seen a
$1000 Federal Reserve Note before, refuses to accept it. Creditor de-
mands that Debtor pay the debt in currency of ordinary denominations,
no larger than $50. Creditor then files suit against Debtor demanding
judgment for $1000 plus prejudgment interest from the due date until the
date of entry of the judgment. A $1000 Federal Reserve Note is in fact
still "legal tender." Yet all this means is that so long as Debtor remains
89. 73B Cl.S. Public Utilities §§ 2, 7 (1983).
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willing to pay by delivery of the Note, Creditor has only itself to blame
for the fact that the debt has not been paid. Accordingly, Creditor cannot
recover prejudgment interest. But, that has nothing to do with Creditor's
right to the $1000 principal amount of the debt.90
Because payment of debts in legal tender is unusual, a creditor has only
limited rights to demand legal tender. Suppose that a person has a con-
tractual duty to perform some act and that the duty is conditioned upon
the other party's payment by a certain date. Suppose that at the payment
date, the debtor tenders some ordinary payment device that is not legal
tender, for example, a check or bank wire transfer. Suppose that the
creditor refuses to accept it, demanding that the payment be made in le-
gal tender. Both general contract law and u.e.e. Article 2 on the sale of
goods treat a demand for payment in legal tender as sufficiently unusual
and surprising that the obligor is entitled to an additional period of time
to make arrangements to pay in legal tender.91
V. ASSERTION OF ADVERSE CLAIMS TO E-NOTES
Suppose that at some point in an E-Note's life, it is transferred in a
transaction that is wrongful against a person with an interest in the E-
Note. In the simplest variety of such scenarios, a scalawag gets hold of
the device by which the E-Note is transferred and transfers it without the
consent of its owner-in short, steals it. In somewhat more complex sce-
narios, the E-Note might have been transferred in a transaction induced
by fraud, mistake, or other invalidating cause, so that the transferor might
have a claim to rescind the transaction and seek to recover the E-Note.
In still other scenarios, the E-Note might be voluntarily transferred by its
owner, but someone else might have acquired a lien or other interest in it
in the hands of the transferor and might seek to assert that claim against
the transferee.
In any such case someone might assert an adverse claim to the E-Note
in the hands of a transferee. If such a claim could be asserted success-
fully, then the utility of E-Notes as a form of money might be significantly
compromised. Fortunately, however, there is an adequate common law
basis to conclude that any such claim would be cut off by a transfer of an
E-Note to a person who gave value for the E-Note without notice of the
adverse claim.
The first step in analyzing whether such an adverse claim could be as-
serted is to consider a bit more carefully the nature of the claim. Con-
90. See, e.g., Liberty Nat'l Bank v. Semkoff, 84 P.2d 438 (Ok. 1938) ("A valid legal
tender made by a debtor and refused by a creditor does not operate as a satisfaction of the
debt; the effect of such tender when maintained being merely to discharge the debtor from
liability for interest accruing subsequent to the tender and costs afterward incurred."
By contrast, suppose that Debtor had proposed to satisfy the obligation by delivering a
matured $1000 U.S. Treasury Note, which is not "legal tender." Suppose that Creditor
refuses the tender and sues. Because the note is not legal tender, Creditor would be enti-
tled to prejudgment interest in addition to the $1000 principal amount.
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 249 (1981); U.e.e. § 2-511(2).
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sider analogous issues involving ordinary chattels.92 Suppose "Owner"
owns a boat, "Thief" steals it, and Thief sells the boat to "Transferee."
Under the ordinary rule summed up in the maxim nemo dat quod non
habet, Transferee can get no better interest than his transferor had. Since
Transferee took from a thief, Transferee gets no title, and must return the
boat to Owner.
It is worth noting that this conclusion rests on the assumption that we
can identify the boat in the hands of Transferee as the same boat that
belonged to Owner. To see the significance of this point, assume a slight
change in our hypothetical. Thief steals a boat from Owner, but Thief no
longer has the boat. Rather, Thief swapped it for a horse. Of course,
Owner can assert a claim to the stolen boat against anyone who ends up
with it. But, suppose that we cannot find the person who now has the
boat. What about the horse that Thief got by swapping the boat? Can
Owner recover the horse from Thief?
Owner cannot assert a claim of simple ownership to the horse, because
it was not the same thing that was stolen from Owner. Owner might,
however, seek the assistance of a court of equity. In the equity court,
Owner could argue that Thief would never have had the horse but for the
theft of the boat from Owner. As against Thief, that contention would
prevail. Accordingly, Owner would be entitled to assert a claim to the
horse by way of constructive trust or equitable lien.
Now suppose that Thief sells the horse to Transferee. Literal applica-
tion of the nemo dat maxim would suggest that if Owner could recover
the horse from Thief, then Owner can also recover the horse from Trans-
feree. That result, however, has universally been rejected, provided that
Transferee took the horse from Thief for value and without notice. Ap-
plying the equitable notion that a court will not shift a loss from one
innocent party to another, it is well settled that if Owner's claim against
the thing in Transferee's hands is an equitable claim, then it is cut off by a
transfer to a purchaser for value without notice. By contrast, if the same
thing that formerly belonged to Owner can be identified as the thing in
the hands of Transferee, then Owner can recover it, even though Trans-
feree gave value without notice of the claim.
Thus, if Transferee takes an E-Note for value and without notice, the
assertion of an adverse claim to the E-Note will fail unless the claimant
can succeed in an argument that the E-Note in the hands of Transferee is
"the same thing" as the E-Note that was formerly in the hands of the
transferor against whom the claim could be asserted. It is not enough for
the claimant to say that Transferee would not have the E-Note but for the
transfer of another E-Note to him; rather the claimant must succeed in a
contention that it is "the same" E-Note. That may well be an extraordi-
narily difficult contention. Deciding what counts as "the same thing"
92. The issues outlined in this paragraph are discussed more fully in Rogers, Negotia-
bility, supra note 15.
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when the "thing" in question is a collection of encrypted data may well
challenge the abilities of even the subtlest of metaphysicians.
Even if a claimant could succeed in a contention that an individual E-
Note in someone's hands is the same E-Note to which the claimant for-
merly had a claim, the common law provides ample basis for cutting off
any such claim against a transferee for value and without notice.93 The
dispositive authority would be the decision of the King's Bench in the
1758 case Miller v. Race.94
In Miller, a Bank of England note was stolen from the mail and passed
to a person who took it for value and without notice of the theft.95 When
the note was presented to the Bank for payment, the Bank refused to pay
or return the note to the person to whom it was passed. The person to
whom the note was passed brought suit,96 and the Court of King's Bench,
in one of Lord Mansfield's best known opinions, held that the person to
whom the note was passed got good title. The opinion in Miller v. Race
assumes, and no one disputed this point, that if actual currency had been
stolen and passed to a person who took it for value and without notice of
the theft, the owner who lost the currency could not recover it. Thus, the
issue in the case was whether a Bank of England note should be governed
by the money rules or by the chattel rules.
To Lord Mansfield, the case was simple. He is reported to have stated
that "he had no sort of doubt, but this action was well brought, and would
lie against the defendant in the present case; upon the general course of
business, and from the consequences to trade and commerce: which
would be much incommoded by a contrary determination."97 He com-
mended the defendant's lawyer for his "ingenious" argument but stated
that "the whole fallacy of the argument turns upon comparing bank notes
to what they do not resemble, and what they ought not to be compared
93. For one of the most potentially problematic types of adverse claims, an answer
may well be provided by statute. Suppose that the adverse claim is that of a person who
held an Article 9 security interest in the property of a person who previously held the E-
Note, either as original collateral or as proceeds. The E-Note is then transferred and the
secured party asserts a claim to it in the hands of the transferee. The Revised version of
Article 9 does not leave such issues solely to the law governing the particular form of
payment instrument involved. Rather, U.c.c. section 9-332 states a general rule that a
security interest cannot be asserted against a "transferee of money," u.c.e § 9-332(a), or
against a "transferee of funds from a deposit account," u.c.e § 9-332(b).
94. 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758).
95. Evidently the note was not issued in the common modern form of an engraved
note for a designated round sum. Rather, it was payable to William Finney, or bearer, in
the amount of twenty-one pounds and ten shillings. From the opinion, however, it is clear
that notes in such form circulated as currency.
96. Procedurally, the case is a bit complex. Miller, the person to whom the note had
been passed, brought an action in trover against Race, the clerk of the Bank of England,
complaining that the Bank's action in refusing to return the note to Miller was wrongful.
The bank defended on the grounds that the note actually belonged to the original owner,
William Finney. Thus, the ultimate issue in the case was the same as if Miller still had
possession and the original owner, William Finney, had brought an action to recover the
note.
97. Id. at 401.
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to, viz. to goods, or to securities, or documents for debts."98 In the criti-
cal passage of the opinion, Lord Mansfield clearly indicated the basis of
his ruling:
Now they are not goods, not securities, nor documents for debts, nor
are so esteemed: but are treated as money, as cash, in the ordinary
course and transaction of business, by the general consent of man-
kind; which gives them the credit and currency of money, to all in-
tents and purposes. They are as much money, as guineas themselves
are; or any other current coin, that is used in common payments, as
money or cash.99
The rule of Miller v. Race was quite uniformly followed by subsequent
decisions in both England and the United States.l°o When the law of bills
and notes was cast into statutory form, the rule of Miller v. Race was
followed not only with respect to bank notes but also with respect to ne-
gotiable instruments of all forms. The rule has also been applied to other
forms of property, such as investment securities, which, while not serving
as a medium of exchange, are routinely transferred in anonymous
markets. lOI
Suppose that a court must decide whether an adverse claim can be as-
serted to an E-Note. It seems that Miller v. Race disposes of the issue. If
we were to state the holding of Miller v. Race-in the precise and narrow
meaning of the term "holding" in our system of precedent-it would have
to be something along the lines of "an item that is treated in commercial
practice as a circulating medium of exchange, in the same fashion as ac-
tual money, is governed by the rule that a purchaser for value without
notice takes good title, even though the item has been stolen." Obvi-
ously, it would make no sense to say that the holding of the case is limited
to notes payable to William Finney or bearer in the amount of twenty-one
pounds ten shillings. Nothing turned on the name of the original payee
or the amount of the note. But, it is equally true that nothing in the case
turned on the precise form of the note; rather, the ruling is based on the
fact that if an item is treated in commercial practice as a circulating me-
dium of exchange, then it is governed by the same rules of property trans-
fers as actual money. Given that fact, it seems that the holding of the
case would amply reach a case in which an E-Note is stolen and trans-
ferred to a person who takes it for value and without notice.
Let me be clear about this point. The contention here is not that a
court confronted with a case of an assertion of an adverse claim to an E-
98. [d.
99. !d.
100. The numerous cases in England and the United States following Miller v. Race are
discussed in any of the standard pre-Code sources on the law of bills and notes. See, e.g.,
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PROMISSORY NOTES §§ 191-97 (1845); 2
THEOPHILUS PARSONS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROMISSORY NOTES AND BILLS OF
EXCHANGE 267-79 (1863).
101. See Rogers, Negotiability, supra note 15, at 476-78; James Steven Rogers, Policy
Perspectives on Revised u.c.c. Article 8, 43 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1431, 1460-73 (1996).
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Note might look to Miller v. Race as a potential source of analogy.
Rather, the claim is that Miller v. Race is dispositive authority, that is, a
court could not refuse to apply the case to an E-Note without either dis-
tinguishing the case from Miller or overruling the cases in the jurisdiction
in question that have previously followed Miller v. Race. I assume that no
court would be so bold as to overthrow 250 years of precedent following
Miller. As to an argument that the case of an E-Note is distinguishable
from that of a paper note, it is hard to see what the basis could be. By
hypothesis, we are assuming that E-Notes are issued with the intent that
they circulate as a medium of exchange, and are used in that fashion. An
argument that the mere form of the notes-electronic versus paper-
should make a difference in the governing law seems quite
unpersuasive.102
VI. TRANSFER OF E-NOTES AS DISCHARGE OF
UNDERLYING DEBT
The single issue on which the old law of negotiable instruments pro-
vides the richest source of guidance for the new law of electronic money
is the question of the effect of transfer of a note on the liabilities of the
parties in the underlying transactions. Suppose that goods or services are
purchased, or a debt is paid, by transfer of an E-Note, but the issuer of
the E-Note becomes insolvent before payment of the E-Note. Does the
transferee of the now worthless E-Note have any action against the trans-
feror of the E-Note?103 There is a rather complex body of law on that
issue, including some aspects of modern statutory negotiable instruments
law, as well as case law concerning circulating bank notes dating from
early-nineteenth century.
The most likely way that a person who transferred an E-Note might be
pursued is by an assertion that the transfer of the E-Note did not dis-
charge the underlying obligation, so that the transferor can still be sued
on the underlying debt.104 The analogous question under current Article
102. Indeed, any argument that Miller does not apply to E-Notes simply because they
are electronic rather than paper would seem to be foreclosed by the Federal Electronic
Signatures Act, discussed infra text accompanying notes 192-94.
103. It is assumed that the transfer of the E-Note will be implemented in such fashion
that there would be no way to assert that the transferor had become liable on the note
itself in the fashion of an indorser of a negotiable instrument.
104. Theoretically, a claim against the transferor of the E-Note might be based on an
assertion that the transferor warranted the collectibility of the E-Note. It is, however,
highly unlikely that a court would rule in favor of such a warranty claim. If the issue were
addressed by analogy to Article 3, the relevant provision would be section 3-416 on trans-
fer warranties. Under that section, a person who transfers an instrument warrants only
that the transferor "has no knowledge of any insolvency proceeding" concerning the obli-
gor of the instrument. u.e.e. § 3-416(a)(5) (emphasis added). The same result would
follow if the question were considered as a matter of general common law. The transferor
of the E-Note might be regarded as an assignor of a right to payment. In the absence of
any specific agreement, an assignor of a right to payment does not warrant that the obligor
is solvent or that the obligation will be paid. At most, the assignor makes more limited
warranties to the effect that the assignor lacks knowledge of any facts that would impair
the apparent value of the assigned right. As the Restatement puts it, "An assignment does
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3 is governed by section 3-310, which provides that unless otherwise
agreed, if an instrument is taken for an obligation, the obligation is dis-
charged if a bank is obligated on the instrument, while the obligation is
merely suspended if a bank is not obligated. lOS Application by analogy of
the principle of section 3-310 would require resolution of two issues: first,
what counts as an "agreement" that the underlying obligation is or is not
discharged contrary to the usual default rules, and, second, what is the
basis for the distinction drawn in Article 3 between instruments on which
a bank is and is not obligated?
A. AGREEMENT TO DISCHARGE
The modern case law under V.e.e. section 3-310, and its predecessor in
the pre-1990 version, V.e.e. section 3-802, provides relatively little gui-
dance on what would count as an agreement to accept an instrument in
discharge of an underlying obligation. The basic problem is that in mod-
ern practice the routine scenario is one in which the same person is the
obligor both in the underlying transaction and on the instrument, as in
the case of payment of an obligation by delivery of a check of the obligor.
Most of the cases under section 3-310 and its predecessor 3-802 involve
that scenario. The questions addressed are fairly fine points of detail.
For example, some of the cases hold that because taking a check suspends
the underlying obligation, a creditor who has taken a check cannot in-
voke penalty or foreclosure rights that would arise between the time that
the check was taken and the time that it was paid.106 Other such cases
not of itself operate as a warranty that the obligor is solvent or that he will perform his
obligation." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 333(2) (1981).
105. The current version of Article 3 states the discharge rule in subsection (a) of sec-
tion 3-310 for the most common forms of instruments on which a bank has incurred liabil-
ity: certified checks, cashier's checks, and teller's check. A certified check is an ordinary
personal check that has been accepted by the drawee bank, U.e.e. § 3-409(d), and accord-
ingly, represents the obligation of that bank, U.C.e. § 3-409(a). A cashier's check is a
check on which the same bank is both drawer and drawee, U.e.e. § 3-104(g), and there-
fore represents the obligation of the bank, U.e.e. § 3-412. A teller's check is a check
drawn by one bank upon another bank, u.e.e. § 3-104(h), and therefore, represents the
obligation of the drawer bank to pay, U.e.e. § 3-414(a). Subsection (c) of section 3-310
provides that the discharge rule of subsection (a) applies to any other instrument on which
a bank is obligated as maker or acceptor. Subsection (b) of section 3-310 states the suspen-
sion but not the discharge rule for non-bank instruments.
Section 3-802 of the pre-1990 version of Article 3 stated essentially the same rule, the
only exception being that under the former rule the discharge rule did not apply to bank
instruments if the underlying obligor was also liable. Suppose, for example, that a bank
issued a teller's check to its own customer as payee, and the customer used the check to
pay an obligation by indorsing it to the obligor. The customer-the underlying obligor-
would be liable on the instrument as the indorser. Thus under the old version of section 3-
802, the underlying obligation of the customer would not have been discharged; meaning
that if the bank dishonored the instrument, the customer could be sued either on the in-
strument as indorser or on the underlying obligation. Under current section 3-310, the
underlying obligation would be discharged, but this makes little or no difference since the
customer would be liable on the instrument as the indorser.
106. See, e.g., Harper v. K & W Trucking Co., 725 P.2d 1066 (Ala. 1986); Merriman v.
Sandeen, 267 N.W.2d 714 (Minn. 1978); Quigley v. Acker, 955 P.2d 1377 (Mont. 1998);
Grumet v. Bristol, 484 A.2d 1099 (N.H. 1984).
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involve timing issues, such as cases about how the suspension principle
affects questions about whether interest is due for the period between the
tender of a check and its payment,107 Modern cases in which a bank in-
strument is taken for an underlying obligation are of relatively little assis-
tance on the question, for the simple reason that uninsured bank failure is
so rare in the modern world. lOS
One may get a bit closer to the issue by considering cases involving
renewal notes. A common scenario is that several people sign a note for
an original loan. When the loan comes due, the most active of the bor-
rowers negotiates a renewal of the loan. Without telling the co-signers,
the active borrower signs a renewal note and forges the signature of the
co-signers of the original note. When the loan goes into default, the
lender proceeds against all who signed the original note, only then discov-
ering that some of the signatures on the renewal note were forgeries.
Those whose signatures were forged defend on the grounds that although
they were liable on the original note, the creditor accepted the renewal
note in full satisfaction of the obligation on the original note. Since their
genuine signatures did not appear on the renewal note, they are dis-
charged if the creditor accepted the renewal note as full satisfaction of
the obligation on the original note.109
Formally, these cases are not treated under the provision on the effect
of taking an instrument for an underlying obligation, since both the liabil-
ity on the original note and the renewal note are Article 3 liabilities. The
issue, however, is essentially the same, inasmuch as it turns on whether
the creditor discharged the liability on the original note by taking the
renewal note. The effect of the relevant Article 3 provision is generally
taken to be that the result turns on the intention of the parties in imple-
menting the renewal.110 Yet when the issue is considered a bit more care-
fully, it becomes apparent that the concept of intention is virtually
useless. Suppose that A and B signed the original note, and that A ob-
tained a renewal, signing the renewal note and forging B's signature.
Suppose that the creditor is asked "Did you intend that A and B would
be liable for the debt; or did you intend that the parties who signed the
new note would be liable for the debt?" What is the creditor supposed to
say? The problem arises precisely because the creditor was not aware of
the fact that the parties who signed the renewal note were not the same
as the parties who signed the original note. Yet under the test of "inten-
tion," the outcome rests on whether the creditor intended X or Y, where,
107. See, e.g., Long v. Cuttle Const. Co., 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 698, 699-700 (1998); Cornell v.
Stimson Lumber Co., 477 P.2d 898, 899-900 (Or. 1970); Ivy v. Am. Road Ins. Co., 409 So.
2d 549, 552 (La. 1981).
108. I am aware of only one case decided after the nc.c. was enacted in which a bank
instrument was taken for an obligation and the bank failed before the instrument was paid.
Chen v Roosevelt & Main St. Realty Corp., 500 N.Y.S.2d 948 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
109. Cases are collected in Gary D. Spivey, Annotation, Renewal Note Signed by One
Comaker as Discharge of Nonsigning Comakers, 43 A.L.R. 3d 246 (1972).
110. See, e.g., Hubbard Realty Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 704 F.2d 733, 735-36 (4th Cir.
1983); Peoples Bank of S.c. v. Robinson, 249 S.E.2d 784 (S.c. 1978).
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by hypothesis, the creditor was unaware of the difference between X and
y.
Inasmuch as the test of intention is virtually useless, the significant is-
sue in the modern cases is the allocation of the burden of proof. If the
rule is that the execution of the renewal note discharges the liability on
the original note, unless a contrary intent is shown, then the outcome in
the usual case would be that the liability is discharged. If, on the other
hand, the rule is that the execution of the renewal note discharges the
liability on the original note only if the creditor so intended, then the
outcome in the usual case would be that the liability is not discharged.
Thus, it is significant that in the modern cases, the burden of proving
intent to discharge is generally placed on the debtor, and therefore the
creditor generally prevails.11l In considering the application of the nine-
teenth-century law of bank notes to E-Notes, it will be equally significant
to consider the precise rules on the allocation of the burden of proof.
Before turning to the nineteenth-century case law, however, it is worth-
while to consider the extent to which other Article 3 rules may affect the
question of discharge.
B. DEFAULT RULES UNDER V.e.e.
The basic rule of discharge in modern Article 3 is that taking an instru-
ment for an underlying debt merely suspends the underlying obligation,
unless the instrument is one on which a bank is obligated. The Official
Comments to Article 3, however, simply state the rule, they do not ex-
plain it: "Subsection (a) deals with the case in which a certified check,
cashier's check or teller's check is given in payment of an obligation. In
that case the obligation is discharged unless there is an agreement to the
contrary."1l2 One frequently sees the discharge rule explained on the
grounds that bank failure is so unlikely that parties presumably intend to
treat bank instruments in the same fashion as cash. For example, Hawk-
land's treatise explains that "[t]he rationale underlying this provision is
that banks seldom become insolvent, and the parties more than likely
implicitly intended that the check be a substitute to payment in cash."1l3
111. See cases collected in Spivey, supra note 109.
112. U.e.e. § 3-310 cmt. 2. The comment to the pre-1990 version of this provision, § 3-
802, is similarly uninformative.
113. 6 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND & LARY LAWRENCE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
SERIES § [Rev] 3-310:2; see also ELLEN A. PETERS, A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS PRIMER
45 (2d ed. 1974) ("Since banks honor their obligations with greater regularity than do pri-
vate debtors, bank paper is treated almost as if it were a safer form of money."); EDWARD
L. RUBIN & ROBERT COOTER, THE PAYMENT SYSTEM: CASES, MATERIALS AND ISSUES
125 (2d ed. 1994) ("What makes these [bank] checks different, of course, is that there is
very little credit risk involved. Unlike the average individual or firm, banks can generally
be relied upon to have money; indeed, state or federal regulators are supposed to close the
bank if this assumption proves to be untrue. With no credit risk, the check is virtually
equivalent to cash."); CLAYTON GILLETTE ET AL., PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND CREDIT IN-
STRUMENTS 78 (1996) ("These instruments are, therefore, considered to be payment mech-
anisms whose characteristics and creditworthiness deviate little from the money for which
they serve as substitutes.")
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That explanation seems plausible at first read, but the plausibility comes
largely from the fact that we have become so unfamiliar with the possibil-
ity of uninsured bank failure that we no longer take these issues all that
seriously. On further thought, it becomes apparent that the fact that
bank failure is unlikely provides no explanation whatsoever for the dis-
charge rule. The question is what rule we should apply in those cases-
however rare they may be-in which the bank that was obligated on the
instrument does fail. It makes no sense to say that because bank failure is
unlikely the rule should be that the underlying obligation is discharged.
We could just as easily say that transfer of bank paper does not discharge
the underlying obligation and explain that the rule is unlikely to have any
significant effect because bank failure is so unlikely.
The drafting history of the V.e.e. is not particularly helpful in under-
standing the position taken on whether taking an instrument discharges
the underlying obligation-other than to suggest that the issue was, prior
to the Code, somewhat more complex than it now appears. The earliest
version of the rules now found in section 3-310 was in the April 1947
draft.l14 It provided that "[u]nless otherwise agreed, an instrument given
for the full amount of an obligation of any person other than the maker,
drawer or acceptor operates as payment, and an instrument given for a
part of the amount operates as payment pro tanto. "115
The initial comment to this provision is rather uninformative, stating
only that "[t]his seems to be generally agreed, at least as a presump-
tion."116 In a subsequent draft, the commentary gives a bit more detail,
A few modern discussions do recognize that there is an issue of allocation of the credit
risk of the bank, but offer relatively little explanation of why that risk is to be allocated to
the person who takes the bank check. See RONALD J. MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND
OTHER FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 424 (2d ed. 2003)
("Because of the bank's obligation to pay, most parties that accept such an instrument view
themselves as having received final payment; the principal risk of nonpayment is the risk
that the bank will become insolvent. Reflecting that perception, UCC § 3-31O(a) and (c)
provides (absent a contrary agreement) that the underlying obligation is discharged when
the obligee takes one of those near-cash instruments. That rule imposes no substantial
burden on the obligee because the obligee that doubts the solvency of the relevant bank
could protect itself by refusing to accept the instrument or agreeing with the payor that the
underlying obligation will remain in effect."); LARY LAWRENCE, AN INTRODUCTION TO
PAYMENT SYSTEMS 209 (1997) ("The rationale is that the parties intended by the use of a
bank instrument to allocate the risk of the bank's insolvency to the taker who could imme-
diately present the bank instrument for payment. Any delay is his fault.")
114. The first draft of what became Article 3 was a partial draft that did not include any
provision on the effect of taking an instrument for an underlying obligation. See U.e.e.
ARTICLE III (Tentative Draft No.1, 1946), reprinted in 2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
DRAFTS 273 (Elizabeth S. Kelly ed. 1984).
115. U.e.e. § 3-101(2) (Tentative Draft No.2, 1947), reprinted in 3 UNIFORM COMMER.
CIAL CODE DRAFTS 45, 106 (Elizabeth S. Kelly ed. 1984).
116. U.e.e. ARTICLE 3 (Notes and Comments to Tentative Draft No.2, 1947), reprinted
in 3 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS 111,230 (Elizabeth S. Kelly ed. 1984). Sub-
stantially the same text appeared as Section 902 of the next draft, the only change being a
switch from speaking of an instrument "given for" an obligation, to one "taken for" the
obligation. U.e.e. § 902(2) (Proposed Final Draft No.1), reprinted in 4 UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE DRAFTS 1, 71 (Elizabeth S. Kelly ed. 1984).
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stating that the rule "is supported by a considerable number of cases."117
The cases cited, however, are based largely on a different principle than
that stated in the text.118
The 1949 draft deleted the provision that taking an instrument of a
third party is presumed to effect a discharge, leaving no rule in the Code
on the matter.119 A year later, in the March 1950 draft, a provision on
discharge re-appeared, now turning on the distinction between bank and
non-bank instruments, rather than between third-party instruments and
those to which the underlying obligor is a party: "Unless otherwise
agreed ... where an instrument is taken for an obligation ... if the instru-
ment carries the obligation of a bank as drawer, maker or acceptor, and
no conditions other than presentment remain to be performed by the
taker, the original obligation is pro tanto discharged."12o
117. U.e.e. ARTICLE 3 (Notes and Comments to Proposed Final Draft No.1), reprinted
in 4 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS 73, 168 (Elizabeth S. Kelly ed. 1984).
118. The four cases cited are Hamilton v. R.S. Dickson, 85 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1936), and
three other cases cited in Hamilton, suggesting that the citations were simply lifted from
the Hamilton opinion without careful consideration of the issue. The four cases cited actu-
ally involve a variety of somewhat different issues. In Hamilton itself, the seller of bonds
refused to accept either the buyer's personal check or that same check certified by the
drawee bank. Instead, the bonds were delivered to a bank that the buyer used as its securi-
ties custodian and payment was made by means of a cashier's check issued by that bank.
The bank that issued the cashier's check failed that evening, and the seller brought an
action on the underlying obligation of the buyer to pay for the bonds. The court ruled that
while an ordinary check did not extinguish the underlying Obligation, "there is a variation
of the general rule where the debt is created simultaneously with the obligation to make
immediate payment and the creditor then takes the credit of a third party instead of insist-
ing upon receiving payment in cash though his contract gives him that right." Id. at 108.
The scenario in Hamilton was an easy one since it combined all of the principles that had
been taken as justifying a conclusion of payment-the seller declined an instrument on
which the buyer would have been obligated; the instrument was taken for a contemporane-
ous rather than precedent debt; the instrument was one on which a third party rather than
the underlying obligor was obligated; and the party obligated was a bank.
The oldest of the three cases cited in Hamilton is Hall v. Stevens, 22 N.E.2d 374 (N.Y.
1889), in which a farmer received a bank draft for cattle, and the draft was dishonored
when it turned out that the bank that had drawn the draft had failed. The New York Court
of Appeals ruled that the farmer had taken the draft as payment, relying primarily on the
principle that an instrument taken for a contemporaneous debt operates as payment. The
second case cited in Hamilton is Atlas 5.5. Co. v. Columbian Land Co., 102 F. 358 (2d Cir.
1900), in which a shipping company sued for freight after a draft given for the amount of
the freight was dishonored. The Second Circuit ruled that taking the draft did not consti-
tute payment, because the instrument was taken for a precedent debt. The third case cited
in Hamilton is New York & Cuba Mail 5.5. Co. v. Texas Co., 282 F. 221 (2d Cir. 1922), in
which the Second Circuit ruled that a debt for freight was discharged where the note of a
third party was taken at the time the debt was contracted.
Thus, the cases cited in the Comment to Proposed Final Draft No.1 stand principally for
the proposition that an instrument taken for a contemporaneous debt is presumed to be
payment, while an instrument taken for a precedent debt is presumed not to be payment.
By contrast, the actual rule stated in Proposed Final Draft No.1 § 902 is based on the
distinction between an instrument of a third party versus an instrument to which the under-
lying obligor is a party.
119. U.e.e. § 3-802 (1949), reprinted in 6 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS 1,482
(Elizabeth S. Kelly ed. 1984).
120. U.e.e. § 3-702 (1950), reprinted in 9 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS 1,56
(Elizabeth S. Kelly ed. 1984).
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The comment gave little explanation, noting only that "[t]he section is
new. It is intended to settle conflicts as to the effect of an instrument as
payment of the obligation for which it is given."121 In the spring 1951
version, the wording was changed slightly to the form that the provision
took throughout all succeeding drafts and in the original version of the
Code as enacted by the states: "Vnless otherwise agreed where an instru-
ment is taken for an underlying obligation ... the obligation is pro tanto
discharged if a bank is drawer, maker or acceptor of the instrument and
there is no recourse on the instrument against the underlying
obligor ...."122
The subject was discussed in somewhat greater detail in the report of
the New York Law Revision Commission on the proposed Code.123 The
Law Revision Commission noted that "[t]here is much difference of opin-
ion as to the effect on the underlying obligation when the debtor gives his
creditor an instrument."124 The report cited a variety of cases on the
question of the effect of taking an instrument to which the underlying
obligor is a party, and noted that in cases where the underlying obligor
was not a party to the instrument, the cases distinguished between in-
stances where the instrument was taken for a contemporaneous versus
precedent debt. Curiously, the report made no mention of cases on the
effect of taking a bank instrument, despite the fact that the distinction
between bank instruments and non-bank instruments was the basis of the
proposed Code rule. The report laconically noted that the Code rule
"would change present law" but offered no opinion on whether the sug-
gested change was or was not desirable.125 Given that the Law Revision
Commission was hardly reticent in expressing disagreement with various
V.e.e. provisions, the mild treatment of the rule on discharge suggests
that the Commission did not regard the topic as particularly important.
Despite the cursory treatment given to the issue in modem law, the
pre-V.e.e. law of bills and notes had developed quite extensive rules on
the effect of taking an instrument on the underlying obligation. It is to
those issues that we now tum.
C. GENERAL THEMES IN EARLY BILLS & NOTES LAW
The classic treatment of the impact of a transfer of an instrument on
the underlying debt is found in Chief Justice Holt's decision in the early
eighteenth-century case of Ward v. Evans. 126 A merchant named Fellows,
who kept his cash with the Lombard Street goldsmith, Sir Stephen Evans,
121. U.e.e. § 3-702 (Proposed Final Draft No.2, 1950), reprinted in 10 UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE DRAFTS 1, 471 (Elizabeth S. Kelly ed. 1984).
122. U.e.e. § 3-702 (Proposed Final Draft No.2, 1951), reprinted in 12 UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE DRAFTS 1, 157 (Elizabeth S. Kelly ed. 1984).
123. 2 STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1955:
STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1204-05 (1955).
124. [d. at 1204.
125. [d.
126. 92 Eng. Rep. 120 (K.B. 1703).
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instructed his servant to go to the goldsmith's shop with Ward's servant
and make a payment to Ward.127 Evans made the payment by delivery to
Ward's servant of a note issued by another goldsmith, Wallis, for sixty
pounds. Evans gave Ward's servant the Wallis note at about noon, at
which time Wallis was still solvent. Wallis continued paying his obliga-
tions on demand all that day, but by the time that Ward's servant brought
the note to Wallis for payment the next morning, Wallis had gone bank-
rupt and stopped paying his notes,l28
Chief Justice Holt flatly rejected the contention that a transfer of a
goldsmith's note could, in all cases, be treated as payment. As he put it:
I am of opinion, and always was (notwithstanding the noise and cry,
that it is the use of Lombard Street, as if the contrary opinion would
blow up Lombard Street) that the acceptance of such a note is not
actual payment. I agree ... that the taking a note for goods sold is a
payment, because it was part of the original contract; but paper is no
payment where there is a precedent debt. For when such a note is
given in payment, it is always intended to be taken under this condi-
tion, to be payment if the money be paid thereon in convenient time.
This note was demanded within convenient time, but if the party who
takes the note, keep it by him for several days, without demanding it,
127. At the goldsmith's shop, Fellows's servant asked Evans to pay £60 lOs to Ward's
servant "and to indorse it on a note of £100 from [Evans] to Fellows, in part payment of the
£100." Id. at 120. The reference to indorsing the £100 note sounds to modern readers like
a reference to the practice of transferring bills and notes by indorsement. In the context of
banking practice of the time, however, it is quite clear that the £100 note issued by Evans
to Fellows was used in much the same fashion as a modern savings account passbook.
Thus, the statement in the report that Evans "indorse[d] £60 lOs as paid on the said note of
£100," means only that Evans recorded on the "passbook" note that £60 lOs of the original
£100 deposit had been paid out, at Fellows's instruction, to Ward. See JAMES STEVEN ROG-
ERS, THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES 119-20 (1995) [hereinafter
ROGERS, HISTORY BILLS & NOTES].
128. Although Ward v. Evans came to be regarded as a leading case on the question of
whether a person can discharge an underlying obligation to another by delivery of a bank
note or other instrument, it is interesting to note that in the case itself, Ward did not sue his
original debtor, Fellows. Rather, Ward brought the action against Fellows's banker, Sir
Stephen Evans. Though Evans disputed the propriety of this form of action, the court
ruled against him on this point, on the theory that when Fellows directed Evans to make
the payment to Ward and to "indorse" the £60 lOs as paid on Fellows's £100 note, Evans
became obligated to Ward for that amount. In modern terms, we might think of this as an
assignment from Fellows to Ward of Fellows' claim against Evans, or, perhaps more accu-
rately, we might treat the transaction as if Evans had opened a temporary bank account for
Ward, debited Fellows' account for the £60 lOs and credited that amount to Ward's tempo-
rary account, and allowed Ward to close the account by withdrawing full amount, lOs in
cash and £60 in the form of the Wallis note. Thus, the issue in the case was whether deliv-
ery of a note discharged an underlying debt, but the debt in question was that of the gold-
smith Evans, rather than Fellows's original debt to Ward. It may also be worth noting that
the argument of plaintiff's counsel, and the reported opinions of both Chief Judge Holt and
Judge Powell lay some stress on the fact that the Wallis note was taken not by Ward him-
self, but by his servant. The judges seemed to be of the opinion that express authority from
the principal would be required to give an agent authority to receive a note in satisfaction
of a debt, though it was conceded that the agent's act could be ratified if the principal
chose to take the note. Although the agency issue might have provided an independent
basis for decision in the case, the judges did not rest on that point but went on to consider
whether receipt of the note would constitute payment.
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and the person who ought to pay it becomes insolvent, he that re-
ceived it must bear the loss; because he prevented the other person
from receiving the money, by detaining the note in his custody.129
Most of the major themes that would playa role in the development of
this body of law are contained in Holt's opinion in Ward. First, there is
the suggestion that while taking an instrument for a precedent debt does
not amount to payment, taking an instrument for a contemporaneous
debt does. Second, if the distinction between precedent and contempora-
neous debts is accepted, there is the problem of drawing the line between
those two categories. Third, if taking an instrument for a precedent debt
does not automatically discharge the debt, there is the question whether
the person who receives the note loses rights on the underlying transac-
tion by delay in attempting to collect the note. Fourth, there is the ques-
tion-which Holt caustically dismissed in his comment about "blowing up
Lombard Street"-as to whether different rules should apply to bank
notes and other instruments. These points will be considered in turn.
D. PRECEDENT VERSUS CONTEMPORANEOUS DEBTS
English cases in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries repeatedly
recognize the rule that an instrument given in payment of simultaneously
contracted debt is taken as payment of that debt. 13o The same result was
also reached by a slightly different route in some other English decisions.
Rather than viewing the transfer of the instrument as the payment phase
of a transaction motivated by the desire for some other exchange, one
might think of the transfer of the instrument as the whole point of the
transaction. That is, one could regard the transaction as one in which the
instrument was sold, with payment being made in some other form. In
the modern world, this seems to be an odd perspective. But, in the com-
mercial world of the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries, it made
perfect sense. At that time, it was routine for debt instruments issued by
private parties to be regarded as a medium of investment. Thus, one who
held an instrument might well sell it to another.131
129. 92 Eng. Rep. at 121.
130. E.g., Anon., 90 Eng. Rep. 1064 (K.B. 1701) ("If a man contracts for goods, and
after carrying them away gives the sel1er a goldsmith's note for the money, it does not
amount to a payment; but if it were given at the very time of the contract, it would be
prima facie evidence that it was taken in payment."); Emly v. Lye, 104 Eng. Rep. 746 (K.B.
1812) ("If a person buy goods of another who agrees to receive a certain bill in payment,
the buyer's name not being on it, and that bill be afterwards dishonoured, the person who
took it cannot recover the price of his goods from the buyer, for the bill is considered as a
satisfaction."); Camidge v. Al1enby, 108 Eng. Rep. 489, 492 (K.B. 1827) ("If the notes had
been given to the plaintiff at the time when the corn was sold, he could have had no rem-
edy upon them against the defendant. The plaintiff might have insisted upon payment in
money. But if he consented to receive the notes as money, they would have been taken by
him at his peril.")
131. In his classic late-nineteenth-century book on the English money market, Walter
Bagehot provides a good description of the function of "bill-brokers," who made it their
business to become familiar with the creditworthiness of traders so that they could
purchase their bills with fair safety:
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If we think of the transfer of an instrument not as the payment phase of
another transaction but as the transaction itself, then it seems fairly clear
that the seller of an instrument has no obligation if the instrument is not
paid, assuming that he did not indorse it or otherwise give some represen-
tation as to its creditworthiness. Such a view of the transaction is re-
flected very early in the English decisions, as in a late seventeenth-
century case where it was noted that "if a bill or a note be payable to one
'or bearer,' and he negotiate the bill, and deliver it for ready money paid
to him, without any indorsement on the bill, this is a plain buying of the
bill...."132 As Lord Kenyon put it in a late eighteenth-century case,
It is extremely clear that, if the holder of a bill of exchange send it to
market without indorsing his name upon it, neither morality or the
laws of this country will compel him to refund the money, for which
he has sold it, if he did not know at the time that it was not a good
bill.133
In the English treatises, the question of whether a person remains obli-
gated on an underlying transaction for which payment was made by trans-
fer of an instrument that was subsequently dishonored was commonly
treated as a question of the obligations of the seller of the instrument,
rather than as a question of whether the obligation in the underlying
transaction was discharged by the transfer of the instrument. For exam-
ple, Byles on Bills, the classic nineteenth-century bills treatise,134 de-
scribes the rule as follows:
[T]he transferer is not even liable to refund the consideration, if the
bill or note so transferred by delivery without indorsement, tum out
to be of no value, by reason of the failure of the other parties to it.
For the sending to market of a bill or note payable to bearer without
indorsing it, is prima facie a sale of the bill. And there is no implied
[T]here will always be a class of persons who examine more carefully than
busy bankers can the nature of different securities; and who, by attending
only to one class, come to be particularly well acquainted with that class....
They act thus as intermediaries between the borrowing public and the less
qualified capitalist; knowing better than the ordinary capitalist which loans
are better and which are worse, they borrow from him, and gain a profit by
charging to the public more than they pay to him.... [B]y far the greatest of
these intermediate dealers are the bill-brokers. Mercantile bills are an ex-
ceedingly difficult kind of security to understand. The relative credit of dif-
ferent merchants is a great 'tradition'; it is a large mass of most valuable
knowledge which has never been described in books and is probably incapa-
ble of being so described.... No one can be a good bill-broker who has not
learnt the great mercantile tradition of what is called 'the standing of the
parties,' and who does not watch personally and incessantly the inevitable
changes which from hour to hour impair the truth of that tradition.
WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET 281-83
(1895).
132. Bank of England v. Newman, 88 Eng. Rep. 1290, 1291 (K.B. 1699).
133. Fenn v. Harrison, 100 Eng. Rep. 842, 844 (K.B. 1790).
134. James Steven Rogers, The Myth of Negotiability, 31 B.C. L. REV. 265, 274 n.13
(1990) [hereinafter Rogers, Myth].
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guarantee of the solvency of the maker, or of any other party.135
American authorities also recognized the rule that a transfer of a third
party's instrument for a contemporaneous debt discharged the debt. In
135. JOHN B. BYLES, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE, PROMISSORY
NOTES, BANK-NoTES AND CHECKS 146-47 (8th ed. 1862); see also JOHN BAYLEY, SUM-
MARY OF THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE, CASH BILLS, AND PROMISSORY NOTES 103 (2d
Amer. Ed. 1836) ("A person who sells a bill without becoming a party to it, incurs no
liability, in case the bill is dishonored.")
There is some confusion on the point in the English authorities as a result of the decision
in Owenson v. Morse, 101 Eng. Rep. 856 (K.B. 1796). In Owenson, a buyer agreed to buy
silver from a silversmith but asked the smith to have the silver engraved. The buyer paid
for the silver by delivering bank notes. By the time the silver was returned from the en-
graver to the silversmith, the bank that issued the notes had failed. The silversmith refused
to deliver the goods, and the buyer brought trover for them. The buyer's argument rested
on the contention that there had been a completed sale, with payment being made by
delivery of the bank notes. So viewed, the loss would rest with the silversmith. It is clear
from the opinion, however, that the court regarded the buyer's argument as nearly uncon-
scionable. As Lord Kenyon observed, "This is an exercise of ingenuity on the part of the
plaintiff. It is an unjust attempt by him to take from an honest tradesman certain goods
which the latter meant to sell to him on receiving a fair price for them." [d. at 857. Not
surprisingly after that introductory remark, the court ruled for the silversmith. The basis of
the decision, however, was not any disagreement with the general proposition that delivery
of the note of a third party amounts to payment. Rather, the decision was based on the
point that there had been no completed sale, because the goods had not yet been delivered
to the buyer, so the seller still had the right of stopping the goods in transit. [d. Later
American decisions treat Owenson as based on the stoppage in transit point, rather than
indicating any change in the basic point that contemporaneous delivery of an unindorsed
note of a third party amounts to final payment. See, e.g., Whitbeck v. Van Ness, 11 Johns.
409 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1814).
Curiously, however, Chitty's treatise treats Owenson as signaling a significant change in
the basic rule, settled since the time of Ward v. Evans, that delivery of an instrument of a
third party in payment of a contemporaneous debt amounts to a final payment. Chitty
states that:
A distinction was indeed once taken between the case of a transfer of a bill
or check for a precedent debt, and that of a transfer for a debt arising at the
time of the transfer, and it was held that if A. bought goods of B. and at the
same time gave him a draft on a banker, which B. took without any objec-
tion, it would amount to payment by A., and B. could not resort to him in the
event of the failure of the banker; but it is now settled, that in such case,
unless it was expressly agreed at the time of the transfer, that the assignee
should take the instrument assigned, as payment, and run the risk of its being
paid, he may, in case of default of payment by the drawee, maintain an action
against the assignor, on consideration of the transfer.
JOSEPH CHITTY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE, CHECKS ON BANKERS,
PROMISSORY NOTES, BANKERS' CASH NOTES, AND BANK-NOTES 123 (1799). That pas-
sage, however, appears not to have convinced even Joseph Chitty's son Edward, whose
1836 treatise states the usual rule that a transferor who does not indorse incurs no liability.
2 EDWARD CHITTY, THE COMMERCIAL AND GENERAL LAWYER 711 (1836) ("Where a bill
or note is delivered without indorsement, not in payment of a pre-existent debt, but in
payment or exchange for goods or other sureties sold at the time, such a transaction
amounts to a sale of such bill or note, and to an election by the transferee to take it as
money with all its risks, and consequently to complete payment by the transferor."). Ed-
ward Chitty's book is, as a whole, quite an oddity. It is, in essence, an adaptation of Black-
stone to the assumed needs of the commercial man. For example, the work begins, as does
Blackstone, with a treatment of the Right of Persons, including Parliament and the King,
but adds to that passage a long dissertation on customs and excise taxes. The treatment of
bills of exchange appears as a long addition following the part of Blackstone that treated
contracts.
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the leading case of Whitbeck v. Van Ness,136 a horse was sold for ninety
dollars, with the agreement that the price would be paid by transfer to the
seller of a note made by a third party. When the note proved uncollecti-
ble, the seller brought an action for the price. The Supreme Court of
New York noted that the general rule on contemporaneous debts was
supported by both English and American authorities and found that
nothing in the facts of the case suggested any contrary intention by the
parties. As the court noted, "The offer was made by the defendant's
agent of Deane's note for the horse; the plaintiff took time to consider
whether it was advisable to take Deane's note, and, after deliberation,
and, we must presume, too, after inquiry, agreed to sell the horse for the
note."137
E. DRAWING THE LINE BEWTEEN PRECEDENT AND
CONTEMPRANEOUS DEBTS
Though Ward v. Evans stands for the proposition that a note does not
discharge a pre-existing debt, nineteenth-century cases suggest that the
line between precedent and contemporaneous debts might be somewhat
flexible. 138 The late nineteenth-century New York case of Hall v. Ste-
vens139 provides a good illustration. Henry Hall, a farmer who lived in
Fredonia, New York, about fifty miles southwest of Buffalo, had agreed
to sell cattle to Joseph Stevens and company, dealers in Buffalo. Hall
arrived in Buffalo midafternoon on April 10, 1882 with seventeen head of
cattle. On arrival, Hall asked how the buyer planned to pay, and he was
told that the buyer could get currency from its bank. The cattle were
weighed and the sales price was computed, amounting to a bit over $1300,
or some $23,000 in today's dollars. Hall went into the buyer's office and
was told by the buyer's clerk that the buyer might not be able to get cash.
Hall then waited about two hours while the buyer sent a messenger to the
bank. The messenger returned not with cash, but with a bank draft paya-
ble to Hall's order. Unfortunately for Hall, the bank obligated on the
draft failed, and he brought suit against the buyer of the cattle for the
unpaid price. The trial court entered a directed verdict against the plain-
tiff, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed. The court noted the
then settled rule that if an instrument is taken for a contemporaneous
debt, it is presumed to operate as payment; while if taken for a precedent
debt, the presumption is the opposite.140 One might have said that the
sale of the cattle was completed at the time of delivery, with the payment
136. 11 Johns. 409 (N.Y. 1814).
137. [d. at 413.
138. By the end of the nineteenth century, American case law on the distinction be-
tween precedent and contemporaneous debts had become quite complex. See 2 THEOPHI.
LUS PARSONS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROMISSORY NOTES AND BILLS OF
EXCHANGE 156-57 (1863); 3 JOSEPH F. RANDOLPH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COMMER.
CIAL PAPER 628-29 (1888); 3 JOHN W. DANIEL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUME!'lTS § 1452 (7th ed. 1933).
139. 22 N.E. 374 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1889).
140. [d. at 376.
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being made a few hours later, in which case the seller would prevail. The
New York court, however, would have none of that, ruling that the evi-
dence presented by Hall did not even raise a jury issue. True, the delivery
of the cattle and the bank draft were not exactly simultaneous, but given
the need to weigh the cattle and arrange for payment, "payment and de-
livery can only be practically, for they cannot be actually, concurrent."141
Accordingly, the court viewed the case as one in which an instrument was
taken for a contemporaneous debt, and therefore operated as payment.
F. DILIGENCE REQUIRED OF THOSE WHO TAKE NOTES FOR
PRECEDENT DEBTS
Even in cases where an instrument was taken for a precedent debt, the
party who took the instrument might find that he lost rights on the under-
lying transaction by delay in dealing with the instrument. Moreover, the
cases indicate that the requirements for diligent action were often so
strenuous that it was likely that one who took an instrument would not be
able to sue on the underlying transaction.
The classic example of this problem is the well-known early nineteenth-
century English case of Camidge v. Allenby.142 On Saturday morning,
December 10, 1825, in York, Camidge sold and delivered corn to defen-
dant. That afternoon, at about three o'clock, the buyer paid for the corn
by delivering four banker's notes, issued by a banking firm located about
forty miles from York. Unknown to either the buyer or the seller, the
banking firm failed and permanently closed at eleven o'clock that day. A
week later, the seller demanded that the buyer take back the notes of the
failed bankers and pay for the cattle. The seller brought suit against the
buyer, and won at trial, subject to the opinion of the Court of King's
Bench whether the transfer of the notes would be deemed payment.
Justice Bayley, who had authored one of the leading treatises on the
law of bills and notes,143 acknowledged the distinction between instru-
ments taken for a contemporaneous versus precedent debts, but seemed
to think that the gap of a couple of hours on the day of the transaction
forced the case into the precedent debt category:
If the notes had been given to the plaintiff at the time when the corn
was sold, he could have had no remedy upon them against the defen-
dant .... Here the notes were given to him in payment subsequently,
and the question is whether they operate as a discharge of the debt
due to the plaintiff in respect of the corn.144
That conclusion would seem to have been fatal to the defendant's case. If
the notes were taken for a precedent debt, then they would be presumed
not to operate as payment, leaving it open to the plaintiff to sue for the
underlying debt for the corn.
141. [d.
142. 108 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B. 1827).
143. Rogers, Myth, supra note 134, at 273 n.lO.
144. 108 Eng. Rep. at 492.
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The result in Camidge, however, was the opposite. The usual rule that
an instrument taken for a precedent debt does not operate as a discharge
was subject to the qualification that the person who took the instrument
might lose the right to sue on the underlying debt if he delayed in at-
tempting to obtain payment of the instrument. In Camidge, the recipient
of the banker's note had not informed the transferor of the banker's fail-
ure until about a week after the event. That delay proved fatal, even
though it is a bit hard to see what difference it could have made. After
all, the banker who issued the note involved in the Camidge case had
failed the same day that the note was delivered-indeed, several hours
before the delivery of the note. Nonetheless, because the seller had
neither passed on the note nor given notice until a week after receiving
the instrument, he lost his right to pursue the buyer on the underlying
transaction.145
G. SPECIAL LAW OF BANK NOTES
Thus far, the question whether a debt is discharged by transfer of an
instrument has been considered only from the perspective of the general
law of bills and notes, without distinguishing bank notes from other in-
struments. Although no such distinction seems to have been drawn in
England, in the United States there were many cases, particularly in the
1830s and 1840s, in which notes of failed banks had been transferred in
settlement of claims, and the courts confronted the question whether the
ordinary bills and notes rules should apply or whether the fact that the
instruments were bank notes intended for circulation required special
treatment.
145. Though the ruling in Camidge v. Allenby that the person who took the instrument
lost his rights as a result of a brief period of delay in giving notice may seem odd, in context
it is more understandable. In the era when private instruments were routinely transferred
as a medium of payment, it was a fairly common occurrence that an instrument used in a
payment transaction turned out to have been issued by a person who became insolvent. If
the instrument was transferred in a fashion that required indorsement, a party who had
passed along the instrument long ago might find that the transaction would come back to
haunt him if the party primarily obligated on the instrument became insolvent. In that
setting, it is hardly surprising that a person sued on a bill would raise any possible conten-
tion. For example, in an early nineteenth-century Massachusetts case, the question
whether the holder had delayed just a bit too long ended up turning on whether com-
mencement day at Harvard College should be counted as a holiday in Massachusetts. City
Bank v. Cutter, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 414 (1826). The English courts had also experimented
with a less rule-bound approach to the question of diligence. In Bickerdike v. Bollman, 99
Eng. Rep. 1164 (K.B. 1786), the requirement of diligence was excused where a hard
pressed debtor held off his creditor by giving him a bill drawn by the debtor on a person
that the debtor knew had no funds due to the debtor and so would not accept the bill.
Starting with a sensible seeming ruling in Bickerdike, the English courts were plagued for
decades with increasingly technical arguments that the facts of the case fit within the Bick-
erdike rule dispensing with the requirement of diligence. See ROGERS, HISTORY BILLS &
NOTES supra note 127, at 202-10. Given how troublesome any exception to rigid rules on
diligence proved in the Bickerdike line of cases, it is not all that surprising that by the time
that Camidge v. Allenby arose, the English courts had lost their appetite for carving any
further exceptions to the rules on diligence and were willing to apply them with a rigor
that, in the abstract, seems odd.
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One of the most frequently cited cases on this issue was the 1834 New
York decision of Ontario Bank v. Lightbody.146 Lightbody was a deposi-
tor of Ontario Bank, who, on May 30, 1828, went to the bank to withdraw
$2000-0ver $30,000 in today's dollars. As part of the $2000 withdrawal,
Ontario Bank gave him a $500 bank note issued by the Franklin Bank of
New York City. Lightbody sent the note to New York City, but, unfortu-
nately for him, it was returned since the Franklin Bank had stopped pay-
ment and closed at about ten o'clock on May 29, 1828, the day before
Lightbody received the note from Ontario Bank. Lightbody demanded
that Ontario Bank buy back the note from him, but Ontario Bank re-
fused. Lightbody received about thirty percent of the face value of the
bank note from the insolvency proceedings for Franklin Bank, and
brought suit against Ontario Bank for the balance.
If viewed under general bills and notes law, the case would seem fairly
simple. Ontario Bank owed Lightbody a debt, resulting from the original
opening of the bank account. Ontario Bank delivered the Franklin Bank
note in an attempt to pay that debt, but the Franklin Bank note turned
out to be worth significantly less than face value. Under Ward v. Evans,
this would seem to be a case in which Ontario Bank attempted to pay a
pre-existing debt by transfer of an instrument, and thus Ontario Bank
would have remained liable on the original debt when it turned out that
the Franklin Bank had failed.
The New York court, however, did not view the case in that light.
Rather it took account of the then-routine commercial practice of pay-
ment of debts by transfer of bank notes that were intended to circulate as
money:
The law is well settled, that where the note of a third person is re-
ceived in payment of an antecedent debt, the risk of his insolvency is
upon the party from whom the note is received, unless there is an
agreement or understanding between the parties, either express or
implied, that the party who receives the note is to take it at his own
risk. The same principle is applicable to the notes of an incorporated
bank, except that as to the latter there is always an implied under-
standing between the parties that if the bill, at the time it is received,
is in fact what the party receiving it supposes it to be, he is to run the
risk of any future failure of the bank. This implied agreement be-
tween the parties arises from the fact that bills of this description, so
long as the bank which issued them continues to redeem them in
specie at its counter, are by common consent treated as money, and
are constantly passed from hand to hand as such. The receiving them
as money, however, is not a legal, but only a conventional regulation,
adopted by the common consent of the community; as no state is
authorized to coin money, or to pass any law by which anything but
gold or silver coin shall be made a legal tender in the payments of
debts.147
146. 13 Wend. 101 (N.Y. 1834).
147. [d. at 104.
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The notion of a rule founded on "conventional regulation" rather than a
"legal" rule is an intriguing, and not wholly explained concept. Appar-
ently, the idea is that just as the individual parties to a transaction could
treat anything as payment if they made their intention clear, so too the
community as a whole, by the routine practice of paying contemporane-
ous and precedent debts by transfer of bank notes, could have consented
to treat the transfer of the bank notes as a means of payment.
Although the approach taken in Ontario Bank might have resulted in a
simple rule that the transfer of a bank note discharges any debt, prece-
dent or contemporaneous, the New York court introduced yet another
complexity into the analysis. The court ruled that once the bank had
failed, its notes could not be treated as the equivalent of currency, even
though the parties were unaware of the failure at the time the note was
passed.148 In support of the Ontario Bank approach, it was sometimes
noted that a contrary rule might encourage dishonest behavior by a party
who held notes and learned, before others in the area, that the bank had
failed. 149 Or, one might draw support for the Ontario Bank approach by
drawing an analogy between notes of a failed bank and counterfeit
notes.l50
148. As the court put it:
This principle of considering bank bills as money, which the receiver is to
take at his own risk, cannot, therefore, be carried any further than the con-
ventional regulation extends-that is, to consider and treat them as money so
long as the bank by which they are issued continues to redeem them in spe-
cie, and no longer. When, therefore, a bank stops payment, its bills cease to
be a conventional representative of the legal currency of the country,
whether the holder is aware of that fact or not; from that moment the bills of
such bank resume their natural and legal character of promissory notes, or
mere securities for the payment of money; and if they are afterwards passed
off to an individual who is equally ignorant of the failure of the bank, there is
no agreement on his part, either express or implied, that he shall sustain the
loss which has already occurred to the original holder of the bills.
[d. at 104-05.
149. For example, the Maine court noted:
Our numerous banks, of small capitals, or of almost no capital, issuing and
pressing into circulation their notes, and gaining for them in numerous in-
stances an ephemeral credit and currency, cannot be considered as cash, if at
all, longer than their credit is maintained. To hold otherwise would open a
door to frauds innumerable. The holder of the notes of a broken bank, living
in its vicinity, would be tempted to hasten into remote and obscure places;
and before the news of the discredit of the bills had reached there, pass them
off to the simple and unwary, who would be utterly unable to prove knowl-
edge of their discredit on the part of him, who had passed them off; and be
therefore compelled to pocket the loss; whereas if the loss is made to fall
upon him, in whose hands they might happen to be, at the time of the failure,
no such result could happen.
Frontier Bank v. Morse, 22 Me. 88 (1842).
150. As the New Hampshire court noted:
The case of a payment in bills of a broken bank cannot be distinguished, in
principle, from that of a payment in counterfeit money. From the time of the
failure of the bank they cease to be the proper representatives of money,
whether they are, at the time, near to, or at a distance from, the bank. They
may have a greater value than counterfeit bills, but in neither case has the
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The approach taken in Ontario Bank was,however, by no means uni-
versally followed. One contrary approach was to apply to bank notes the
same rules that had long ago been developed for bills and notes in gen-
eral. The best known example of that approach was Corbit v. Bank of
Smyrna,15I in which the Delaware court explicitly rejected the Ontario
Bank approachI52 and ruled that bank notes should be treated in the
same fashion as any other instrument. Thus, the transfer of a bank note
would operate as a discharge of a contemporaneous debt but not a prece-
dent debt. 153
While the approach taken in Corbit ensured that the loss from failed
bank notes rested with the party who had accepted them-before or after
the bank failed-for a contemporaneous debt, it necessarily also had the
consequence that the transfer of bank notes would not operate as final
payment of a precedent debt. That, in part, was the result that the Onta-
rio Bank approach was intended to forestall. The problem of transfers of
failed bank notes for precedent debts probably accounts for a third ap-
proach which finds significant support in the early-nineteenth-century
case law. Under this approach, the transfer of a bank note results in the
final payment of either a precedent or contemporaneous debt, whether
the bank note was transferred before or after the bank failed.
The approach of treating the transfer of a bank note as final payment,
regardless of the time that the debt was incurred or the time that the
bank failed, is seen in two cases decided just after Ontario Bank, but evi-
dently too soon thereafter for the Ontario Bank case to have been
brought to the attention of the courts. The cases, both decided in 1835,
are the Tennessee decision in Scruggs v. GassI54 and the Alabama deci-
sion in Lowrey v. Murre/. 155
In the Tennessee case, Gass purchased bacon from Scruggs for $126-
about $2000 in today's dollars-sometime early in 1832. In August of
that year, he transferred notes of the Bank of Macon in payment of the
debt. Unknown to either party, the Macon Bank had failed in July.
Given the particular sequence of events, the buyer would have lost under
both the Ontario Bank approach and the Corbit approach. Under the
New York rule applied in Ontario Bank, the transfer of the notes would
not have amounted to payment because the Macon Bank had failed
before the notes were transferred. Under the Pennsylvania rule applied
in Corbit, the transfer of the notes would not have amounted to payment
because the notes were transferred in payment of a pre-existing debt.
party received what in the contemplation of both parties he was entitled to
receive, if the contract was to pay a certain sum.
Fogg v. Sawyer, 9 N.H. 365, 367-68 (1838). The rules concerning counterfeit notes are
discussed more fully infra text accompanying notes 173-84.
151. 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 235 (1837).
152. [d. at 253, 258-59.
153. [d. at 260.
154. 29 Am. Dec. 114 (Tenn. 1835).
155. 2 Port. 280 (Ala. 1835).
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Given these difficulties, one can imagine how forsaken Ga~s must have
felt when he awakened to discover the truth about the Macon Bank notes
that Scruggs had taken for the bacon.
The Tennessee Supreme Court, however, ruled that the debt had been
discharged. The court thought that the rules on counterfeit notes should
not apply to notes of failed banks, and it treated the case as a simple
matter of a completed transaction that one of the parties later regretted.
Moreover, the court noted that allowing the buyer to recover might pre-
sent intractable practical difficulties since it was common to accept bank
notes whose worth was subject to constant fluctuation depending on the
bank's reputation. As the court put it,
To adopt a different rule would end in much litigation and confusion.
If Scruggs could recover from Gass, the latter, of course, could have
his remedy against the person from whom he received the paper; and
by this means it would be traced back, by suits, to the holder at the
period when the bank refused specie payment. And, if insolvency of
the bank would authorize the recovery on the original demand, no
reason is perceived why, by the same rule, partial inability to pay, on
the part of the corporation, would not authorize a partial recovery
for the amount the bank-notes were worth less than specie in the
market-a rule which, if adopted, would threaten endless strife and
litigation.156
The Alabama court adopted essentially the same approach, for essen-
tially the same reasons, in Lowry v. Murrell. 157 Lowry owed money to
Murrell and, in payment of the debt, transferred notes of a bank in Geor-
gia that turned out to have failed. The Alabama court ruled that a seller
or other creditor who takes a bank note takes the risk of the solvency of
the bank, just as the buyer takes the risk of the value of goods purchased:
If an article of property be sold in good faith, without warranty, ap-
parently of great value, when in fact it was of little or none, the ven-
dee is without remedy; if in the same contract, and in the same good
faith, bank notes be taken in payment, and the result should after-
wards be found so far different, that the property prove sound, but
the notes unavailable from the failure of the bank, the loss must, in
like manner be borne by the vendor. The principle must be the same
where the payment has been made of a pre-existing debt. Bank
notes are usually in rapid circulation as cash, and are apt to pass
through many innocent hands after the bank has stopped payment,
and before notice thereof has reached the place; after which, nothing
could be more embarrassing to commerce, than to upset all such
transactions; nor would there be any justice in the principle: it would
carry the responsibility back to the holder who first passed the note
after the moment of failure, when several subsequent holders may
have passed it in like manner, and without loss to themselves.15s
156. Scruggs, 29 Am. Dec. at 115.
157. 2 Port. at 280.
158. [d. at 285.
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The same issue came before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Bay-
ard v. Shunk in 1841.159 The decision came sufficiently after the New
York ruling in Ontario Bank that the Pennsylvania court had the occasion
to consider the New York rule explicitly. The court found little to com-
mend the New York approach.160 The court noted that the Tennessee
court in Scruggs had reached a result opposite to the New York rule, and
it cited dictum from a well-known Massachusetts decision to the same
effect.161 The Pennsylvania court also relied to a considerable extent on
dictum in Lord Mansfield's well-known opinion in the 1758 case of Miller
v. Race.162 In Miller the court refused to apply to Bank of England notes
the ordinary rule that the true owner of a chattel can recover it from
anyone who takes it from a thief.163 As the court in Bayard stressed, the
ultimate significance of Miller v. Race is that the usual property rule for
chattels should not apply to bank notes that are treated as a form of cur-
rency,164 So too, the Pennsylvania court ruled that neither the usual
Ward v. Evans rule for negotiable instruments nor the Ontario Bank ap-
proach of distinguishing the transfer of notes before versus after the bank
had failed was apt to the commercial practice in which bank notes were
routinely transferred as a medium of payment. Speaking specifically of
the Ontario Bank approach, the court noted:
It is no answer to say the note of an unbroken bank may be instantly
converted into coin by presenting it at the counter. To do that may
require a journey from Boston to New Orleans, or between places
still further apart, and the bank may have stopped in the mean time;
or it may stop at the instant of presentation when situated at the
place where the holder resides. And it may do so even when it is not
insolvent at all, but perfectly able eventually to pay the last shilling.
This distinction between previous and subsequent failure, evinced by
stopping before the time of the transaction or after it, is an arbitrary
and impracticable one. To such a payment we must apply the cash
principle entire, or we must treat it as a transfer of negotiable paper,
imposing on the transferee no more than the ordinary mercantile re-
sponsibility in regard to presentation and notice of dishonour. There
is no middle ground. But to treat a bank note as an ordinary promis-
sory note, would introduce endless confusion, and a most distressing
state of litigation. We should have reclamations through hundreds of
hands, and the inconvenience of having a chain of disputes between
successive receivers, would more than counterbalance the good to be
done by hindering a crafty man from putting off his worthless note to
an unsuspecting creditor. No contrivance can prevent the accom-
plishment of fraud, and rules devised for the suppression of petty
159. 1 Watts & Sergo 92 (Pa. 1841).
160. See id. at 96-97.
161. The Massachusetts case cited in Bayard was Young v. Adams, 6 Mass. (5 Tyng) 182
(1810), which, as is discussed infra text accompanying note 174, dealt with the question
whether the transfer of counterfeit notes amounts to payment.
162. 1 Watts & Sergo at 97.
163. 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (1758).
164. Bayard, 1 Watts & Sergo at 97.
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mischiefs have usually introduced greater ones.165
H. ApPLICATION OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY LAW TO E-NoTES
Let us consider, then, how a court in the twenty-first century should
approach a case in which an E-Note has been transferred in payment of a
debt, but it turns out that the issuer of the E-Note is insolvent. The credi-
tor in the underlying transaction brings an action against the debtor on
the underlying obligation, and the debtor defends on the grounds that the
underlying obligation was discharged by transfer of the instrument.
As with the previously considered case of an assertion of an adverse
claim to an E-Note,166 it hardly seems plausible for a court to say that the
issue is entirely new. Quite the contrary, the issue in the E-Note case
would be just the same as the issue in the many nineteenth-century cases
dealing with whether an underlying obligation is discharged by transfer of
a paper instrument of a third party who proves to be insolvent. The dif-
ference is that while the adverse claim issue was quite simple, the nine-
teenth-century law on discharge of an obligation by transfer of an
instrument was, as we have seen, quite complex.
One approach would be to say that whether the transfer of the E-Note
discharges the underlying obligation is determined, in the first instance,
by the distinction between precedent and contemporaneous debts. That
would follow the approach taken to bank notes in the Delaware case of
Corbit v. Bank ofSmyrna, which treated bank notes under the same rules
that had been developed for bills and notes generally. That approach
would provide a sensible resolution to many of the scenarios that might
be presented by use of E-Notes. To the extent that the E-note system is
used as a payment device in ordinary retail transactions, the E-Note
would commonly be transferred in payment of the purchase price of
goods or services provided contemporaneously. In such cases, transfer of
the E-Note would be presumed to operate as a discharge of the underly-
ing debt. Of course, one would then be left with the problems of distin-
guishing precedent from contemporaneous debts and deciding what
would count as evidence that, contrary to the presumption, a transfer of
an E-Note was intended as a discharge of a precedent debt.
The Delaware decision in Corbit, however, seems to represent a dis-
tinct minority view insofar as it suggests that no special rules were re-
quired for bank notes. As we have seen, most courts in the nineteenth
century ruled that special rules were required for bank notes. One ap-
proach, illustrated by the New York decision in Ontario Bank v. Light-
body, is that the transfer of notes of a solvent bank operates as a
discharge of any debt, but the transfer of a bank note after the bank has
failed is not treated as a discharge. That approach, however, presents
substantial difficulties of drawing the line between bank notes passed
165. [d. at 98-99.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 92-102.
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before and after the bank's failure. A simpler and probably more sensi-
ble approach is the one taken in other jurisdictions, including Tennessee,
Alabama, and Pennsylvania, that a transfer of a bank note operates as a
discharge of the underlying debt, whether the debt is contemporaneous
or precedent, and whether the bank note is transferred before or after the
bank fails.
One point that stands out in all of the early nineteenth-century cases is
that the rationale for a special rule for bank instruments is completely
different from that commonly given for the special bank instrument rule
in modern law. As we have seen, the rule in V.e.e. Article 3, that a
transfer of an instrument on which a bank is liable discharges the under-
lying debt, is commonly "explained" by the observation that bank failure
is unlikely.167 In the early nineteenth century, that suggestion would
have seemed ludicrous-bank failure was an all too common event.
Thus, the early nineteenth-century cases provide a far better basis for
considering whether and why special rules are required for bank instru-
ments. Virtually all of the American jurisdictions concluded that such
special rules were required and uniformly considered that the rationale
for such special rules was not that bank failure was unlikely, but that
bank notes were so commonly used as a medium of payment.
It is also worth noting that although bank notes were the most common
form of currency, circulating notes were also issued by other commercial
entities, such as railroads, turnpike companies, and insurance companies.
One of my favorite examples of such notes, from my own collection, is a
two dollar circulating note issued by the Adrian Insurance Company of
Michigan which bears on its face evidence of its own soundness in the
form of a picture of a dog guarding a strongbox, surrounded by the leg-
end "Capital $250,000."168 Regrettably, no decisions concerning circulat-
ing notes issued by non-bank entities have been located. It is, however,
not difficult to predict how a court in the early nineteenth century would
have treated such a case. The rationale for the special rule for bank notes
was not that banks were inherently different from other entities, but that
bank notes were treated by commercial custom as a medium of exchange.
It seems inconceivable that a nineteenth-century court would have de-
clined to apply the special law of bank notes to printed circulating notes
issued by other commercial entities that were obviously intended to oper-
ate as a circulating medium of exchange.
Perhaps a way of unifying the various approaches taken in the nine-
teenth-century cases can be found in the elusive concept of intention. All
of the approaches found in the nineteenth-century cases were, at least in
theory, only default rules that operated in the absence of specific evi-
dence of the parties' intention. As we have seen, however, little guidance
would be provided by a general rule that the outcome turns on the par-
167. See supra note 113.
168. One can find a sampling of such notes in the catalogs of dealers in obsolete paper
money, such as Denly's of Boston, available at http://www.denlys.com.
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ties' intentions. Rather, the significant question is what features of a
transaction should be taken, in the absence of other more specific evi-
dence, to show that the parties "intended" the transfer of the instrument
to operate as final payment.
In that regard, consider two nineteenth-century New York cases, Tobey
v. Barber169 and Hall v. Stevens.l7° In Tobey, decided in 1809, a person
had leased a farm for two years and attempted payment of the rent due
by means of transfer to the lessor of some turnpike company shares and a
note of a third party. When the note given by the lessee proved uncol-
lectible, the lessor brought an action for the unpaid rent. The court, ap-
plying the rule settled since the time of Ward v. Evans, held that the
transfer of the note did not amount to final payment of the precedent
debt. As the court put it, .
The taking of the note was no extinguishment of the debt due for the
rent. It is a rule well settled, and repeatedly recognized in this court,
that taking a note, either of the debtor or of a third person, for a
preexisting debt, is no payment, unless it be expressly agreed to take
the note as payment, and to run the risk of its being paid; or unless
the creditor parts with the note, or is guilty of laches in not present-
ing it for payment in due time. He is not obliged to sue upon it. He
may return it when dishonored, and resort to his original demand. It
only postpones the time of payment of the old debt, until a default
be made in the payment of the note. I71
Although the basis of the decision purports to be the intention of the
parties, the commercial context may be far more significant. In Tobey,
the lessee attempted to pay the rent by transferring an odd miscellany of
items, including some turnpike company shares and a note issued by an-
other private party. Today, that seems terribly odd. Why would the
lessee attempt to make payment of the rent in such an odd form, instead
of by the ordinary means of delivery of some device routinely treated as a
medium of exchange? The answer is that, at that time and place, there
was no such "ordinary" medium of exchange. At the time, long predating
the development of modern banking facilities, it would not have been at
all unusual for a debtor to offer to pay the debt in such a miscellany of
forms. A creditor would have little choice but to accept the effort. Given
the absence of any realistic choice, it is not surprising that the rule devel-
oped that the transfer of the various items should be treated only as an
attempt to make payment, not as payment itself.
In contrast to Tobey, consider the facts of the 1889 case of Hall v. Ste-
vens, discussed above, in which a farmer lost his suit for the price of cattle
which he had sold for a bank draft that proved uncollectible. The farmer
who sold cattle in Hall specifically asked how the buyer was to pay. After
some discussion of whether the buyer would pay in currency, the seller
169. 5 Johns. 68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809).
170. 22 N.E. 374 (N.Y. 1889).
171. Tobey, 5 Johns. at 72-73.
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ultimately accepted a bank draft-to which the buyer was not a party.
One gets the sense from the report that the farmer took the draft with a
sense of resignation, remarking, "I suppose you could not get the cur-
rency."l72 Therein lies the key. The farmer's reluctance to accept the
bank draft was obviously a result of his realization that in taking it he was
running a risk of bank failure, and that he would not run that risk if he
had held out for currency. On the other hand, he probably felt that insist-
ing on currency might either delay completion of the transaction or per-
haps even cause the buyer to refuse to go through with the deal. He
made his choice. He regretted it, but he made his choice.
Now consider a twenty-first-century transaction in which a person pro-
poses to pay for a transaction, or a pre-existing debt, by transferring an E-
Note. The seller or creditor has a host of choices about what forms of
payment will be acceptable. Cash, check, credit card, debit card, elec-
tronic funds transfer, or whatever-all are available, though each offers
differing degrees of convenience, expense, and risk. If the seller or credi-
tor takes an E-Note, has he not made his choice? His situation seems just
like that of the farmer in Hall v. Stevens who made his choice by taking
the bank draft. The scenario facing the seller or creditor is nothing like
that faced by the landlord in Tobey whose debtor offered a miscellany of
possible ways of transferring value because there was no real alternative.
Rather, the seller or creditor who accepts an E-Note will have done so
because it seemed convenient or commercially desirable to do so rather
than insisting on payment in some other medium. Given that circum-
stance, there is every reason to apply to the transaction a legal rule that
can readily be deduced from the nineteenth-century cases, to wit, if you
choose to accept an E-Note as a medium of payment, you take the risk of
the possible insolvency of the issuer. If you don't like that risk, insist on
some other form of payment.
VII. COUNTERFEIT E-NOTES
One problem that warrants discussion in connection with the develop-
ment of E-Note systems is the concern that E-Notes might be counter-
feited. A related concern is sometimes discussed in the modem literature
on E-Notes under the heading of spawning. The problem of "spawning"
is generally taken to cover the possibility that a user of a genuine E-Note
would cause the amount thereof to be increased or, that a user of an E-
Note might find a way to attain the equivalent of the proverbially desired
feature of cakes, that is, the user might transfer the E-note but still have
it.
Though spawning and related problems seem like novel problems of
the new technology, the analogous issue of counterfeit bank notes was a
routine legal issue in the early nineteenth century. Today, when paper
currency is exclusively issued by a governmental agency, the form of pa-
172. Hall, 22 N.E. at 375.
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per currency is well-known, and the governmental issuer has taken great
pains to make counterfeiting difficult. In the nineteenth century, by con-
trast, the circulating medium of the country consisted of notes issued by
an enormous number of banks and other commercial entities, all issued in
their own form, with varying extents of anti-counterfeiting measures.
Thus, one to whom a given bank note was tendered in payment might
never have seen a note issued by that bank before, and thus would have a
difficult time assuring that the note was genuine.
There are a fair number of American cases involving counterfeit bank
notes, dating from the beginning of the nineteenth century. The basic
rules were fairly well-established and far more uniform than the rules on
the effect of transfer of genuine notes of a failed bank. The leading cases
were an 1807 New York decision, Markle v. Hatfield,173 and an 1810 Mas-
sachusetts case, Young v. Adams.174 In both cases, the issue was seen as
fairly straightforward. As Chancellor Kent put it in Markle,
The justice of this case is clearly with the [seller]. He parted with his
goods to the plaintiff, without receiving the compensation which was
intended. It would be a matter of regret, if the law obliged us to
regard a payment in counterfeit, instead of genuine, bank bills, as a
valid payment of a debt, merely because the creditor did not per-
ceive and detect the false bills, at the time of payment.175
The same rule was applied in any number of other cases in the early nine-
teenth centuryP6
As in the case of genuine notes of failed banks, however, the law on
counterfeit notes cannot be understood fully without considering the con-
sequences of the actions of the person who received the counterfeit note.
For example, in an 1825 Pennsylvania case, Raymond v. Baar,177 a shop-
keeper's clerk received a bank note in payment for goods. When the
shopkeeper first saw the note about two weeks later, he recognized it as a
counterfeit. The shopkeeper, however, did not make any claim upon, or
bring suit against, the person who had passed the counterfeit until some
six months later. The Pennsylvania court had little trouble ruling that the
delay cost the recipient the benefit of the usual rule that a debt is not
discharged by transfer of a counterfeit bank note. As the court stated,
This is a very plain case. The plaintiff was guilty of most unreasona-
ble negligence; he kept the note six months after he knew it to be
counterfeit, without giving notice to the defendant; it was his duty to
return it to the defendant as soon as he discovered it to be
counterfeit.178
173. 2 Johns. 455 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1807).
174. 6 Mass. (5 Tyng) 182 (1810).
175. 2 Johns. at 459.
176. Simms v. Clark, 11 Ill. 137 (1849); Mudd v. Reeves, 2 H. & J. 368 (Md. 1808);
Hargrave v. Dusenberry, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 326 (1823); Ramsdale v. Horton, 3 Pa. 330
(1846).
177. 13 Sergo & Rawle 318 (Pa. 1825).
178. Id. at 319.
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There are numerous other cases in the nineteenth century in which a per-
son who had received a counterfeit bank note lost his rights by delay in
proceeding against the person who passed the note.179
In addition to delay in proceeding against the person who passed the
counterfeit, a person who received a counterfeit might lose the right of
recourse on the grounds of negligence in not detecting the falsity of the
note at the time it was passed. As noted in a mid-century New York case,
"There may be negligence in two ways, either in making discovery of the
worthlessness of the paper, or in making return of it within a reasonable
time."180 The principle that a person who receives counterfeit notes may
be precluded from recovery by failure to exercise diligence at the time
the notes were passed received its fullest application in cases in which the
counterfeit notes were passed to the very bank that supposedly had is-
sued them. For example, in Gloucester Bank v. Salem Bank,181 the Salem
Bank held some $8500 (over $90,000 in today's dollars) in notes purport-
edly issued by the Gloucester Bank. The Salem bank delivered the notes
to the Gloucester Bank after business hours. The next day, the notes
were put away for safekeeping by the Gloucester Bank. About two
weeks later, the Gloucester Bank discovered that many of the notes were
counterfeit. The Gloucester Bank's action against the Salem Bank failed
on the ground that although the Gloucester Bank could have taken a day
or so to verify the notes, the delay of two weeks in learning that its own
notes were counterfeit precluded it from recovering.
A similar issue came before the United States Supreme Court in Bank
of United States v. Bank of Georgia.182 The Bank of the United States
presented notes of the Georgia bank to that bank and received credit for
them in mutual accounts between the banks. It tuned out that the Geor-
gia Bank notes had been fraudulently altered-changing the amounts
from five to fifty dollars and from ten to one hundred dollars. The Bank
of the United States brought an action on the account, that is, sued to
recover the amounts of the altered notes. In an opinion by Justice Story,
the United States Supreme Court ruled for the Bank of the United States.
The opinion notes that the question was not the general issue of the liabil-
ities of parties to a transfer of a counterfeit note, but whether the bank
whose own notes had been counterfeited could recover the amount after
accepting the notes.183 Though a period of a couple of weeks had passed
179. Wingate v. Neidlinger, 50 Ind. 520 (1875) (counterfeit U.S. currency transferred in
February 1873, demand not made until August 1873); Atwood v. Cornwall, 28 Mich. 336
(1873) (counterfeit U.S. currency transferred in March 1867, demand not made until Au-
gust 1867); Thomas v. Todd, 6 Hill 340 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1844) (bank note received on May 5,
discovered counterfeit shortly thereafter, demand not made until July 4); Pindall's Ex'rs v.
NW Bank, 34 Va. (7 Leigh) 617 (1836) (bank note returned as counterfeit on March 8,
demand not made on transferor until May.
180. Kenny v. First Nat'l Bank of Albany, 50 Barb. 112, 114 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1867)
(emphasis in orig.).
181. 17 Mass. 33 (1820).
182. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 333 (1825).
183. [d. at 342-43.
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between the time when the notes were presented to the Georgia Bank
and the time that the Georgia Bank discovered the alteration, the opinion
suggests that the significant fact was not so much the delay after receiving
the notes, but the fact that the bank itself had received them without
detecting the alteration at the time the notes were presented. As Justice
Story noted,
the receipt by a bank of forged notes, purporting to be its own, must
be deemed an adoption of them. It has the means of knowing if they
are genuine; if these means are not employed, it is certainly evidence
of a neglect of that duty, which the public have a right to require.l84
As applied to E-Note systems, the principles of the nineteenth-century
counterfeit bank note cases would, at first blush, seem to place the risk of
counterfeit E-Notes on the party who received the E-Notes. The dili-
gence rules developed in the setting of counterfeit bank notes may, how-
ever, produce a result that is, in practice, the opposite.
Consider first the final stage in the life of an E-Note-the stage of re-
demption when an E-Note is submitted to its issuer for payment in some
other form. Suppose that the issuer makes the payment but later discov-
ers that the E-Note was counterfeit. Can the issuer recover the payment
on the grounds that it was made by mistake in exchange for what turned
out to be a counterfeit? The decisions in Gloucester Bank v. Salem Bank
and Bank of United States v. Bank of Georgia seem dispositive. In those
cases, the courts ruled that the bank whose own notes had been counter-
feited was precluded from recovering the amount of the payment on dis-
covery that the notes had been counterfeited. Even more so than the
nineteenth-century system of circulating bank notes, the issuer of E-
Notes should be held responsible for the adequacy of whatever security
devices it has put into place as part of the system. If those security mea-
sures prove inadequate, and the issuing bank pays what turns out to be a
counterfeit E-Note, any attempt to recover that payment would seem
precluded by the holding in such cases as Gloucester Bank v. Salem Bank
and Bank of United States v. Bank of Georgia.
Now, let us consider the earlier phase in the life of an E-Note, the stage
of transfer from one user to another. If an obligation is settled by the
transfer of an E-Note, and the E-Note is later discovered to be counter-
feit, can the transferee recover? As we have seen, the law of counterfeit
bank notes and currency begins with the proposition that the transfer of a
counterfeit is a nullity. However, that principle is limited by the notion
184. [d. at 343. In both Gloucester Bank v. Salem Bank and Bank of United States v.
Bank of Georgia, the courts also stressed the analogy to Lord Mansfield's well-known rul-
ing in Price v. Neal, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1763), that a drawee that had accepted or paid
a bill purportedly drawn on it was precluded from recovering the amount of the bill if it
turned out that the drawer's signature was forged. At the time of Price v. Neal, the rule
could, with some plausibility, be based on the notion that a drawee was expected to know
the signature of its drawer. For a discussion of a modern rationale for the Price v. Neal
rule, see James Steven Rogers, The Basic Principle of Loss Allocation for Unauthorized
Checks, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 453 (2004).
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that a person to whom a counterfeit is transferred may lose the right to
sue on the underlying transaction if he is guilty of a lack of care in receiv-
ing the counterfeit or a lack of promptness in reporting the problem to
the transferor. The key question is what counts as sufficiently diligent
action to preserve the right to sue on the underlying transaction. Again,
the security systems used in the E-Note system may well provide the an-
swer. Virtually any form of E-Note system would include some sort of
security device, the function of which is to determine whether a tender E-
Note is or is not genuine. Thus, a transferee will accept an E-Note only
after testing it under whatever security system is in place. Remember
that in the modern world a party has many choices about the form of
payment that the party will accept. If a party chooses to accept an E-
Note and does so after employing whatever security measures are built
into the system, the diligence principle of the case law on counterfeits
could well be taken to preclude the party from later objecting that the E-
Note was not genuine.
VIII. CONCLUSION-APPLICATION OF THE OLD LAW OF
BANK NOTES TO E-NOTES
We have seen that, at least on some issues of private law, there was a
well-settled body of case law dating from the early nineteenth century
concerning payment by transfer of bank notes. To be sure, the nine-
teenth-century case law cannot resolve all, or even most, of the legal is-
sues that lawyers advising the architects of E-Note systems and
policymakers concerned with the development of E-note systems must
consider. In particular, the nineteenth-century law will provide no useful
assistance on the qu;estions of policy and law presented by such matters as
whether only certain entities should be permitted to issue E-Notes and
what financial conditions and disclosure regimes should be imposed on
those who do issue E-Notes. But, on certain matters of private law in-
volving disputes that might arise in the use of E-Notes, the nineteenth-
century law of circulating bank notes seems entirely relevant. The old
law of bank notes would provide binding rules of decision for cases in-
volving E-notes unless the fact that the notes are in electronic rather than
paper form is itself a sufficient basis for distinguishing the law of paper
bank notes.
In addressing that question, the first point to consider is the impact of
the conversion of the law of bills and notes from judge-made to statutory
form. We have seen that the modern law of negotiable instruments, codi-
fied in Article 3 of the u.e.e., applies only to instruments that are writ-
ten on paper,185 Does this mean that the pre-statutory law of bills and
notes survives only in the form of the statutory law that is limited to pa-
per instruments? If so, then lawyers and courts confronting issues about
E-Notes are free to ignore the nineteenth-century case law concerning
185. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
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bank notes, except perhaps as one of many potential sources of analogy
for the development of a common law of E-Notes. But, the conclusion
that the pre-Code law of bank notes survives only in the form of the pa-
per-bound rules of Article 3 will not withstand analysis.
In the first place, as a general matter, the fact that a given subject might
have been, but was not, included in the U.e.e. can hardly be taken to
render irrelevant the pre-Code non-statutory law. As is well known, the
contours of the coverage of the U.e.e. were determined by many factors,
including chance and politics. For example, motor vehicle certificate of
title laws were not included because of the political difficulties of meshing
the prior statues into a uniform enactment.l86 The law of agency, which
in earlier times was an extremely important branch of commercial law,
was originally proposed as the subject of a U.e.C. article, but soon
dropped.187 The law of personal property leases was left out of the origi-
nal version of the U.e.e. but was included several decades latter as Arti-
cle 4A.188 Although it calls itself a "Code," the u.e.e. is quite explicit on
the general question of its impact on related subjects that did not happen
to have been included: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of
[the Uniform Commercial Code], the principles of law and equity, includ-
ing the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, princi-
pal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion,
mistake, bankruptcy, and other validating or invalidating cause shall sup-
plement its provisions."189 Thus, as a general matter, one should be re-
luctant to conclude that the enactment of the U.c.e. destroys the vitality
of case law on matters not expressly covered by the Code.
With respect to the law of circulating bank notes, there is even further
reason to doubt any suggestion that the enactment of the Code affects the
pre-Code law. It would be one thing if, at the time the Code was
adopted, there was an existing robust system of circulating bank notes,
and that system was comprehensively governed by the Code. But, by the
time of the enactment of the Code and its predecessors, the system of
circulating bank notes was largely a memory. The Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law was promulgated in 1896, patterned on the English Bills
of Exchange Act of 1882. By the time that American law of negotiable
instruments became statutory, a generation had passed since the system
of circulating private bank notes had come to an end. The era of private
circulating bank notes ended with the enactment of the National Bank
Act in 1864.190 That Act established the beginnings of a national cur-
rency system, in which notes were still, in form, issued by individual fed-
erally chartered banks, but the notes were uniform in form, and a system
186. 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 20.8 (1965).
187. Fairfax Leary & Michael A. Schmitt, Some Bad News and Some Good news from
Articles Three and Four, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 611, 612 (1982).
188. See generally Charles M. Mooney, Personal Property Leasing: A Challenge, 36
Bus. LAW. 1605 (1981).
189. u.e.e. § 1-103(b).
190. 13 Stat. 99 (1864).
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of reserve requirements for issuance of the notes had the effect of making
notes of any national bank essentially equivalent to those of any other
bank. At the same time, the National Bank Act put a prohibitive tax on
circulating notes of state-chartered banks, a tax upheld by the United
States Supreme Court in 1869.191 Therefore, there would have been no
reason for the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law to have dealt in any
detailed way with the system of circulating bank notes that had passed
into oblivion long before the statute was written.
Thus, American law of circulating notes entered a state of "suspended
animation" with the end of the system of circulating bank notes in the
1860s. No legislative enactment or course of judicial decisions can be re-
garded as a rejection of the law of circulating notes, because there simply
was no occasion to apply or further develop that body of law. The law's
subject matter had effectively been legislated out of existence. Yet, if the
system of circulating notes were to develop again, one assumes that the
old law should continue to apply. Suppose, for example, that the provi-
sions of federal law that effectively prohibit the issuance of circulating
notes by banks were repealed, and that banks once again began issuing
circulating paper notes. It is hard to see why the early nineteenth-century
case law concerning circulating bank notes would not apply to them.
Should one not reach the same conclusion with respect to the develop-
ment of E-Note systems? If the only, or principal, difference between an
E-Note system and the early-nineteenth-century system of circulating
notes is that E-Notes are in electronic form while early-nineteenth-cen-
tury circulating notes were written or engraved, it is hard to see why that
difference in media should automatically make the nineteenth-century
case law of circulating notes irrelevant.
Indeed, there is a plausible argument that courts are now precluded by
statute from refusing to apply the nineteenth-century case law of circulat-
ing notes to E-Notes. In 2000, the federal government enacted the Elec-
tronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act ("Electronic
Signatures Act")192 which, with various differences of detail, covers the
same basic territory as the Uniform Electronic Transactions ACt.193 The
principal objective of the Electronic Signatures Act was to overcome ob-
stacles to electronic contracting posed by the statute of frauds or other
statutory requirements of writings or signatures. Yet, the key provisions
of the Electronic Signatures Act are not limited to that objective. The
statute provides that
Notwithstanding any statute, regulation, or other rule of law (other
than this title and title II), with respect to any transaction in or af-
fecting interstate or foreign commerce-
191. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533 (1869).
192. 15 U.S.c. §§ 7001 et seq. (2000).
193. For discussion of the federal law, and its relationship to state enactments of the
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, see Robert A. Wittie & Jane K. Winn, E-Sign afthe
Times, E-COMMERCE LAW REPORT (July 2000).
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(1) a signature, contract, or other record relating to such transaction
may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely be-
cause it is in electronic form; and
(2) a contract relating to such transaction may not be denied legal
effect, validity, or enforceability solely because an electronic signa-
ture or electronic record was used in its formation.
Let us suppose that an E-Note system is implemented, and a dispute in-
volving the use of an E-Note goes to litigation. Suppose that the issue in
the lawsuit is one on which there was extensive case law in the early nine-
teenth century concerning circulating bank notes. Is the court free to ig-
nore the nineteenth-century cases merely because they involved written
notes while the case at hand involves an electronic note? The minimum
reading of the impact of the Electronic Signatures Act would be that a
court could not say that the electronic note is unenforceable merely be-
cause it is in electronic rather than written form. But, it is by no means
clear that the impact of the Electronic Signatures Act is that limited.
The Electronic Signatures Act states that a contract may not be denied
"legal effect" solely on the ground that it is in electronic form. Let us
consider how that mandate would apply in litigation involving E-Notes.
Suppose that the issue presented in a case involving an E-Note is analo-
gous to a matter involving circulating paper bank notes on which there is
a substantial body of case law dating from the early nineteenth century.
Suppose further that the nineteenth-century case law on circulating bank
notes would, if applied to the case, produce a certain outcome. Is it not a
denial of "legal effect" to say that a different outcome should be reached
for the electronic note, merely because it is in electronic rather than writ-
ten form?194
Thus, we have seen that, contrary to common assumptions that under-
lie most modern discussion of the law of electronic money, courts ad-
dressing questions that might be posed by systems of electronic money
will not be called upon to make entirely new law, unguided by precedent.
To be sure, many of the legal issues presented by E-Notes systems, such
as matters of disclosure and regulation, are genuinely new. On issues of
194. There is a provision in the Electronic Signatures Act that, in general, defers to
state enactments of the Uniform Commercial Code for rules on electronic contracts and
signature requirements. That provision, however, does not seem to affect the question of
the application of the Electronic Signatures Act to E-Notes. The provision in question
states that the basic rule, quoted above, "shall not apply to a contract or other record to
the extent it is governed by ... the Uniform Commercial Code, as in effect in any
State ...." 15 U.S.c. § 7003(a)(3) (2000). But, as we have seen, Article 3 of the Uniform
Commercial Code does not apply to a note in electronic form. Since an E-Note would not
be "governed by the Uniform Commercial Code," the exclusion in the federal Electronic
Signatures Act seems to be inapplicable.
Another provision of the federal Electronic Signatures Act creates rules on "transfera-
ble records," designed to permit electronic documentation of mortgage lending arrange-
ments. 15 U.S.c. § 7021 (2000). The effect of these provisions is to make much of Article
3, particularly the provisions specifying the rights of holders in due course, applicable to
electronic notes. That provision might have had a significant effect on E-Notes but for the
fact that it is explicitly limited to a note issued in electronic form that "relates to a loan
secured by real property." 15 U.S.c. § 7021(a)(I)(C) (2000).
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private law, however, the extensive body of case law developed in the
early nineteenth century concerning circulating bank notes provides, at
the very least, a powerful source of analogy. Indeed, we have found no
plausible basis for concluding that the difference between circulating
notes in paper form and circulating notes in electronic form is, in itself, a
sufficient basis for distinguishing the old law from the new. In short, the
early-nineteenth-century law of bank notes already is the New Old Law
of Electronic Money.
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